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ANTISEMITISM AND THE LAW-
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1945, Elie Wiesel was liberated from the Nazi death camps.
He had been deported to Auschwitz from his home in Hungary one
year earlier, in the spring of 1944. By the time of liberation, his
mother and sister had been gassed and his father had died at his
side from torture, exhaustion, illness and starvation. Of his initial
view of Auschwitz, he writes that he turned to his father in disbe-
lief and asked for reassurance that they were in the twentieth
century, not the Middle Ages. He turned once more to his father,
seeking guidance when young Jewish males, newly unloaded from
cattle cars, discussed resisting the guards while their fathers coun-
selled docility. When asked by his son what he thought, Wiesel's
father replied that he thought that thinking no longer mattered.'
f Copyright 0 1994, Vivian Grosswald Curran.
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MA., Columbia University, 1977; M. Phil., Columbia University, 1979; Ph.D., Columbia University,
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Wiesel's writing has been accused of nihilism and of exemplifying
a deconstructionist perspective. Deconstruction similarly has been ac-
cused of being nihilistic, defeatist and of constituting a destructive
"Holocaust Judaism." Deconstruction and the works of Wiesel are
indeed linked, but not by nihilism or defeatism. Instead, both emanate
from anti-totalitarianism, reflecting their historical contexts. Both Jac-
ques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, and Elie Wiesel, chroni-
cler of the holocaust, wrote in France after the Second World War, in
the wake of the extermination camps, French collaboration with the
Nazis and the gulag of Stalinist Russia.
This essay examines deconstruction from an historical perspective
in order to clarify its evolution and to suggest its usefulness for legal
analysis. It also addresses the fervent antipathy which deconstruction has
aroused in many legal scholars and demonstrates that current criticism
fails to assess deconstruction on its merits. The normative nature of legal
scholars' attacks against deconstruction masks a refusal to face the possi-
bility that the tenets of our legal system do not assure the perpetuation
of our system or provide a reliable safeguard against the horrors which
have befallen other societies throughout history and in our own time.
Like Wiesel's writing, and like other modernist movements in
literature, painting and music, deconstruction signals the end of the
Enlightenment view of human civilization as progressing in tandem
with increased scientific discovery. Where the Enlightenment marked
the transfer from God to humans of the source of hope for civilization,
the cataclysmic events wrought by twentieth-century totalitarianism
marked a profound change in the Western intellectual's view of hu-
manity. After Auschwitz and the gulag, absurdity, barbarity, chaos and
regression became part of the perception of human progression; a
coherent view of mankind required incorporation of profound inco-
herence.
Deconstruction reflects the Western intellectual's perspective in
the second half of the twentieth century by its focus on antinomy and
irresolvable, inherent contradictions. This focus provides the frame-
work for a Weltanschauung which can incorporate the nonlinear and
the absurd. Deconstruction both represents a rejection of the absolut-
ist approach which characterizes totalitarian regimes and implies the
need for skepticism in the face of those who claim to possess truth.
The historical context permits us to understand deconstruction's loca-
tion in a pendulum swing veering away from totalitarian absolutism,
but not extending as far as nihilism.
On another historical level, deconstruction became known to
legal scholars in the United States by way of French literature depart-
ments which had been structuralist in approach before becoming
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deconstructionist. This essay examines the evolution in the United
States from pre-structuralism to structuralism to deconstruction, in
order to demonstrate that structuralists adopted deconstruction as a
remedy to the absolutist strictures in structuralist theory, and because
of its methodological rigor in analysis.
The two historical contexts converge in establishing deconstruc-
tion's anti-absolutist perspective. Against this dual historical backdrop,
deconstruction's focus on unearthing inherent contradictions embed-
ded within propositions can be better understood as applying to fields
like law, in which terms and concepts are fluid and contestable, but
not as extending to a generalized denial of the existence of meaning
or of truth.
This essay also addresses the thesis of Guyora Binder, published
in 1989 in the Yale Law Journal, that deconstruction operates as a
parasitic theory, always by opposition to something else, and that it is
nihilistic through its absence of affirmative presence or identity. Binder
concludes that deconstruction is inappropriate to legal analysis and
that it is a form of "Holocaust Judaism," best exemplified through
Wiesel's writing, and ultimately destructive to Jewish identity. Binder's
charge is novel, for traditional criticism has accused deconstruction of
affording respectability to holocaust denial through the indiscriminate
validation of all interpretations, while Binder accuses deconstruction of
dwelling on the Holocaust. Binder's thesis is of interest in that it iden-
tifies and explores the seminal historical influences on deconstruction
of Levi-Straussian structuralism and French existentialism. This essay
argues a different interpretation of both the nature of structuralism
and French existentialism and the nature of their influence on decon-
struction, and suggests that, contrary to Binder's interpretation, decon-
struction emerges as an affirmative interpretive methodology which
enriches textual analysis in law by expanding our perceptions of pre-
viously unperceived relationships and levels of signification. In doing
so, deconstruction also can promote increased tolerance and effective
social and political action.
Contrary to the claims of deconstruction's critics, the view ex-
pressed by Wiesel's father in Auschwitz that thinking does not matter
is antithetical to deconstructionist analysis. It is also antithetical to
Wiesel's outlook, for both focus affirmatively on the future, and are
intent on incorporating the lessons of our time, so as to gauge relevant
issues with greater insight.
Part I explores the entry of deconstruction into American schol-
arly circles by way of French literature departments and traces decon-
struction's antecedents, pre-structuralism and structuralism, in order
to clarify the attributes of deconstruction which caused its adoption as
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the interpretive theory of preference. Pre-structuralist critical theory
was rejected for its lack of analytical rigor in favor of structuralism,
which sought to transform the study of texts into a systematic, scientific
inquiry. Structuralism, however, made excessive claims of scientific
reliability, and specifically of yielding a unique, correct interpretation
for the text under scrutiny. Against the backdrop of structuralism's
excesses, deconstruction emerges more clearly as a methodology which
rejects structuralism's claims of yielding scientific truths through tex-
tual interpretation, but which does not extend as far as some of its
critics (and some of its proponents) suggest: namely, to a denial of the
possibility of truth or of meaning.
Part II examines deconstruction, exploring its similarity to struc-
turalism as a methodology involving intense scrutiny of all textual
phenomena and characterized by analytical rigor, while differing from
structuralism in that it announces the coexistence of contradiction at
all levels of the text. Deconstruction's focus on inherent paradox is the
source of criticism that deconstruction is nihilistic and antifoundation-
alist, denying the existence of truth. I reject this criticism, arguing that,
where structuralism implies the existence of truth, deconstruction
takes no position on that issue. I also examine and refute charges that
deconstruction is random in application or that it validates all mean-
ings, thereby undermining the concept of meaning. Moreover, the view
that deconstruction is nihilistic generally presupposes that it is a phi-
losophy. I argue that deconstruction is, rather, only a methodology, an
interpretive tool, and that its usefulness in analyzing legal texts is as
such.' Rather than providing, or aspiring to provide, foundational
values, deconstruction enables the interpretant to reach a fuller un-
derstanding of the analyzed text from which to reach decisions in
keeping with his or her values.
Part III explores deconstruction's implications for the legal field
and suggests that it is aligned with the Hobbesian view that society is
in a permanent state of peril due to problems endemic to human
nature, rather than with the Enlightenment view of civilization pro-
gressing as a corollary to increased knowledge and understanding.
Deconstruction's critics have failed to respond to deconstruction on
its merits, dwelling rather on normative arguments. I suggest that
much of the criticism of deconstruction by legal scholars stems from
a reluctance to face the deconstructionist implication that our laws and
2 Although I distinguish between methodology and philosophy, I acknowledge that decon-
struction, like all methodologies, is not without philosophical implications. See infra notes 42-61
and accompanying text for a discussion of the methodology/philosophy dichotomy.
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Constitution are not safeguards for the perpetuation of our system or
of the rule of law. I refer to France during the Second World War as a
system similar to our own, whose laws and Constitution proved unable
to achieve self-perpetuation. I also refer to the antisemitic legislation
of the Vichy regime, much of which the French enacted independently
of German pressure or coercion, and suggest that deconstructionist
analysis would have pierced its surface resemblance to other laws and
exposed the underlying discriminatory and, ultimately, murderous,
nature beneath the smooth exterior of comfortingly familiar legal
discourse.
Part IV challenges the thesis of Guyora Binder that deconstruction
is a form of "Holocaust Judaism," a search for identity by opposition
to Nazism which Binder characterizes as devoid of affirmative value
and therefore defeatist and nihilistic. In his criticism of deconstruc-
tion, Binder encompasses a condemnation of holocaust studies as
pernicious to Jewish identity, and concludes that deconstruction has
no place in legal analysis. I agree with Binder's assessment of the
importance of French existentialism and Levi-Straussian structuralism
to deconstruction, but analyze both to show that, contrary to Binder's
interpretation, both deconstruction and holocaust studies are affirma-
tive in nature because (1) Levi-Strauss' structuralism represents a search
for universal, objective truths, rather than a theory of relativism; and
(2) Sartre's existentialism represents a philosophy of hope, rather than
of despair, premised on a belief in human freedom and individual
responsibility for ethical social behavior. In keeping with the analysis
of prior sections, I dispute Binder's contention that, in Wiesel's writing,
Auschwitz signifies the death of God. Rather, Auschwitz signifies the
end of the view, cherished since the Enlightenment, that human civi-
lization is perfectible and can be expected to progress in linear fashion,
in keeping with scientific progress. Moreover, both deconstruction and
holocaust studies are responses to the absolutism of the totalitarian
regimes of the twentieth century, but are not restricted to issues con-
cerning Jews. In its illumination of differences within sameness and
vice versa, and its expansion of analytical perceptions through the
elucidation of unsuspected relations within the text, deconstruction
offers a framework for tolerance.
II. DECONSTRUCTION'S ENTRY INTO AMERICAN ACADEMIC
CONSCIOUSNESS
Deconstruction was introduced to the United States in the field
of literary criticism and largely through the efforts of Paul de Man,
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long-time chairman of Yale's French Department.' Deconstruction is
the brainchild of Jacques Derrida, who was frequently a Visiting Pro-
fessor in Yale's French Department during the 1970s. 4 Many attributes
of deconstruction, such as its intense focus on language and on lin-
guistic and phonic interrelatedness, make the interest of critical liter-
ary methodologists in deconstruction easy to understand. It may well
be a matter of historical fortuity that philosophers did not first intro-
duce deconstruction to American scholars, given the philosophical
underpinnings of Derrida's work.' Others have written about the in-
fluence of Hegel, Heidegger and phenomenology in Derrida's writing,
and some legal scholars have begun to note the influence of Sartrian
existentialism as well.' The large number of refugees from France and
other Francophonic countries who taught in the French departments
of American universities after the Second World War no doubt height-
ened the chance that members of French literature departments, rather
3
 David Lehman notes in particular the influence of de Man's 1971 book, Blindness and
Insight, in introducing Derrida to American scholars. See DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES:
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN 145 (1991). Criticism of deconstruction became
more vehement after the posthumous discovery that de Man had been a Nazi collaborator in his
native Belgium. Not only did de Man succeed in disguising a past which included bigamy as well
as collaboration, but, surprisingly, no one seems to have made the connection until after Paul de
Man's death in 1983 that Henri de Man, perhaps the most prominent of the Belgian Nazis, was
de Man's uncle. I do not address the de Man controversy directly here, but I hope that my analysis
of deconstruction provides a framework for assessing the issue of whether the sordid life of one
of deconstruction's most influential proponents affects the theory.
4
 See id. at 144. Derrida has remained a much sought-after lecturer in the United States
academic community including, in recent years, the legal Held. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Force of
Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 C.ARDOZO L. REV. 921 (Mary Quaintance trans.,
1990) (delivering papers in an October, 1989 colloquy on "Deconstruction and the Possibility of
Justice," at which Derrida was the keynote speaker); see also Mitchell Stephens, Jacques Derrida,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 22-24 ("[D] econstruction continues to haunt large
numbers of students and faculty. They have packed auditoriums and lecture halls at New York
University, the Cardozo School of Law and the New School for Social Research in which Derrida
has been speaking during his annual month long stay in New York.").
5
 I refer to phenomenology and existentialism. Derrida's academic training is in the field of
philosophy.
6 More will be said later with respect to existentialist implications and influences. Guyora
Binder discusses deconstruction's relation to existentialism at some length in Representing Nazism:
Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989). Although he is one
of the few to detect the importance of existentialism to deconstruction, Binder has reached
conclusions different from my own with respect to his reading of existentialist philosophy and
his view of its interpretation by, and influence in, French society. See infra notes 81-115 and
accompanying text. For the influence of Hegel on Derrida, see Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction
and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism,
11 CARDOZO L, REV. 1211, 1219 n.24 (1990), and sources cited therein. For an analysis of
phenomenology's application to modernist criticism, see Donald H.J. Hermann, Phenomenology,
Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to
Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379 (1982).
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than scholars in other fields, would discover Derrida, particularly be-
cause Derrida's writing is notorious for lack of clarity, making access
to Derrida even more difficult for non-native readers of French than
for native Francophones.?
The fact that French literature departments introduced Derrida
to the United States is significant in that deconstruction became known
to American legal scholars as a critical methodological approach to
literary texts' Deconstruction, commonly referred to as post-structural-
ist, became the prevailing critical methodology in literature depart-
ments previously dominated by structuralist literary theory. For a full
understanding of deconstruction's significance in the United States, it
is necessary to understand the structuralist and pre-structuralist liter-
ary criticism which preceded it as well as to examine the significance
of structuralism as it was adopted by the literature departments which
subsequently became deconstructionist in approach.
A. Structuralism and Pre-Structuralism in Literary Criticism
The scientific rigor of structuralist methodology provided an over-
whelming attraction for the French literary scholars in American uni-
versities who were structuralists before becoming deconstructionists,
for rigor in logic and reasoning were not privileged features of pre-
structuralist French literary criticism. 9
7 Balkin relates the theory that the lack of clarity may be an intentional rejection by decon-
structionists of the Cartesian clarity of which the French bourgeoisie is enamored, as part of an
overall reaction against the bourgeoisie: "Most-structuralist thinkers, most of whom were French,
deliberately adopted an obfuscatory style in reaction to the bourgeois French preference for la
cfariU '" J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. REV. 743, 745 n.6 (1987)
(citing John Sturrock, Introduction to STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE 16-17 (John Sturrock ed.,
1979)). See ROLAND BAWrins, CRITIQUE ET VERITP. 28-29 (1966) for an analysis (and debunking)
of French society's view that clarity is intrinsic to the French language and proof of its linguistic
superiority as a model of logic. See also Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1203, 1204 & n,3 (citing Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruc-
tion, 94 YALE LJ. 209, 236-37 (1984) (book review)), for the principle that clarity is an unworthy
goal because it "deradicalizes." According to Lehman, "Michel Foucault once described Jacques
Derrida's prose style as an effort at 'obscurantist terrorism.'" LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 98. My
own view is that Derrida's lack of clarity stems from his reluctance to make absolutist pronounce-
ments, His meandering style (characterized by what is called in French a va-et-vient) reflects the
humility of his stance vis-h-vis his own conclusions, his reluctance to assume that his explanation
has an exclusive propriety over truth.
8 See LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 145 (referring to the "tailoring of [Derrida's] methods to the
exigencies of an American academic specialty: literary criticism"); Arthur Austin, A Primer on
Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. REV. 201, 228 (1992) (referring derisively
to deconstruction as "a French fad on literary criticism threatening to change the course of legal
education").
9 Here it is important to distinguish between French and Anglo-American literary scholar-
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The hallmark of French pre structuralistliterary criticism is a
discourse more akin to literature than to science, fluid and ambulatory
in style. To the extent that pre-structuralist French literary criticism
can be categorized as a study, it is a study in which the literary text
does not have primacy over the author or author-figure. 1 °
French pre-structuralists viewed literature as being so indelibly
marked by the author that no separate or separable literary text could
exist." Consequently, French literary scholarship was imbued with specu-
lative comments about a putative presence referred to as the author.
The totality of the fusion between the individual personality of the
author and the literary text left literary criticism with a task too elusive
and unpredictable to amount to much more than an exercise in emo-
tion and appreciation.
Thus, the French literary scholar Jean Guehenno, famous for his
work on Rousseau and Michelet, as well as for the searing portrayal in
his memoirs of life in France during the German occupation, manifests
a typical pre-structuralist approach in the following passage concern-
ing Rousseau's "Discourse on the Inequality of Arts and Sciences:"
Sacred solitude of just and pure hearts. He [Rousseau] cried,
but his tears were tears of joy. He felt himself purified of all
taintedness. Twenty years of uncertain battle, so many insults
borne, so much misery, so much humiliation; none of it had
vanquished him. Jean-Jacques was inaccessible and his soul
had not changed in the slightest . . . . He was Rousseau.
Rousseau, like his father Isaac Rousseau, citizen of Geneva.
Not one of those Parisians, without character and faceless,
exhausted by politeness and weathered like a pebble rubbed
down by the sea. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, citizen of Geneva.
He was the faithful son of the new Zion, the man with a
country, of a republic where people knew what virtue was. He
ship. The latter did have a pre-structuralist tradition both creative and analytically rigorous. I
think in particular of such non-structuralist literary scholars as Lionel Trilling and Northrop Frye.
Indeed, like the structuralists, Frye rejects metatextual criticism, considering it as parasitic. See
NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 3 (1957).
to should be noted that my use of "pre-structuralist" in this context refers to the "unstruc-
turalist" criticism against which structuralists reacted, rather than to such precursors of structu-
ralism as Propp or Sow iau. See infra note 16.
The Larousse encyclopedia of the nineteenth century is a repository of contemporaneous
academic literary beliefs. The article entitled "Style" reflects the view that the author's presence
permeates the literary text. 14 PIERRE LAROUSSE, GRAND DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL Du XIXE
SIECLE, FRANCAIS, HISTORIQUE, GtOGRAPHIQUE, MYTHOLOGIQUE, BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE, LITTERAIRE,
ARTISTIQUE, SCIENTIFIQUE, ETC. 1158-60 (1866-1876). See also Georges Louis Button, Diseours
Sur Le Style, in MORCEAUX Cuoists 1-14 (1906), for the idea that style represents the fusion of
the author with the written work.
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was still that child who sang the psalms, who, while his father
worked, read him every day Plutarch's Illustrious Men. Purity,
simplicity of the sunny house. Happiness. Aunt Susan embroi-
dered, his father worked, he read. He heard himself still
naming Brutus, Agesilas, Aristide, Fabricius. They had known
the meaning of virtue. He heard himself reading—it was in
the life of Pyrrhus—: Fabricius, a great captain but poor, had
come as ambassador to the king and the king fawned on him
and offered him much silver and gold, and Fabricius, inac-
cessible, incorruptible, "sent him far away with his present."
His heart melted at those memories. He stopped, sat down
under a tree, pulled out a small notebook, a pencil. He wrote:
"0 Fabricius, what would your great soul have thought . . ."
It was his own which was overflowing. 12
One can see in this passage, for which no historical confirmation
exists, the ethos of the pre-structuralist literary criticism of French
scholars." It is evocative, poetic and literary. It functions largely as
literature, as a kind of metatext, reflecting the primary source rather
than explicating it.
Structuralism radically changed scholarly examination of litera-
ture. Like Chomsky's structural linguistics and Levi-Strauss' structural
anthropology, structuralist literary criticism aims to reveal the funda-
mental principles which govern literariness, systematizing the compo-
nents of literary discourse in novel categories. Systematization is the
fundamental and revolutionary attribute which structuralism intro-
duced into French literary criticism." Although defects in structuralist
theory would cause structuralists to turn to deconstruction," the attrib-
ute of systematization is as essential to deconstruction as it is to struc-
turalism.
At the foundation of structuralism is the belief in universal laws
or structures. The theories of Claude Levi-Strauss, the structural an-
thropologist," and N.S. Troubetzkoy and Noam Chomsky, structural
 lin-
'JEAN GUgHENNO, JEAN-JACQUES EN IVIARGE DES "CONFESSIONS" 281-82 (1948) (my trans-
lation).
13
 The failure to distinguish between text and author is also evident in the titles of such
pre-structuralist literary criticism RS JEAN FRAPPIER, CHRETI EN DE TROYES, L'HOMME ET L'OEUVRE
(1957) [CHR4TIEN DE TROYES, THE MAN AND THE WORK],
14
 See, e.g., Jonathan Culler, The Linguistic Basis of Structuralism, in STRUCTURALISM 34
(David Robey ed., 1973) (referring to structuralist literary criticism as characterized by the
novelty of some of [its] categories but primarily by [the] ... intense desire to systematize").
15 See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
16
 Robert Scholes also discusses precursors of structuralism in literary criticism who exerted
considerable influence on modern structuralists. The Russian formalist Vladmir Tropp engaged
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guilts, in large measure inspired critical literary structuralism. Chom-
sky refers to a universal grammar common to all human beings, allowing
people to develop their own languages, and to generate communica-
tive structures as needed in particular subcultures. Audible linguistic
phenomena which human beings do not universally share are defined
as surface structures, in contrast to deep structures, which are defined
as those attributes of language which human beings do universally
share." Similarly, Lëvi-Strauss describes all human behavior as subject
to universal laws." The structuralist dichotomy between surface and
deep structures is reminiscent of Freud's distinction between the mani-
fest and latent content of dreams.'9
 In both the structuralist and the
Freudian undertaking, the interpreter seeks a deep meaning by me-
ticulous attention to the surface attributes, which represent a code,
however difficult to decipher, for the underlying truth which it simul-
taneously leads to and disguises. The structuralist interpretive enter-
prise, like the Freudian, proceeds from the manifest content—par-
lance, the text as it appears—to the latent content, or deep, underlying
in a structuralist undertaking in the 1920s in his classification of Russian folk tales. Propp has
figured prominently in, among others, the writings, lectures and seminars of the structuralist
academic Tzvetan Todorov. Perhaps less well known is Souriau, whose Les DEUX CENT MILLE
SITUATIONS DRAMATNUES developed a systematizing approach to literary phenomena. See ROBERT
SCHOLES, STRUCTURALISM IN LITERATURE 50-51 (1977). Scholes also connects the structuralist
(and, incidentally, deconstructionist) view of language as "the primary characteristic of human
existence" to the nineteenth-century poets Shelley and Coleridge: "[T]here are important con-
nections between romantic and structuralist views of language, and, indeed . . . we should not
have a structuralism if we had not had a romanticism." Id. at 170. Scholes further asserts that
a crucial shift in thinking about language took place between the middle of the
seventeenth century and the end of the eighteenth . . . . Broadly speaking, it is a
shift from an atomistic and ontological view of language (individual words repre-
senting things in reality) to a view that is contextual and epistemological (combi-
nations of words representing mental processes). The latter view . . . operates .. .
in romantic thought in general, and in all structuralist thinking about language. It
is in fact the prevailing modern view of language.
Id. at 173,
17 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, ESSAYS ON FORM AND INTERPRETATION (1977); NOAM CHOMSKY,
LANGUAGE AND MIND (1968); NOAM CHOMSKY, STUDIES ON SEMANTICS IN GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
(1972); see also ROMAN JAKOBSON, CHILD LANGUAGE APHASIA AND PHONOLOGICAL UNIVERSALS
11 (1968).
18 See generally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson & Brooke
Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963). Levi-Strauss also discusses structural linguistics as consisting of
the search for general, absolute laws. Id. at 33.
19 See SIGMUND FREUD, INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (1950). Many structuralist and decon-
structionist literary critics have a deep interest in Freudian analysis. The semiotician Julia Kristeva
became an analyst, working simultaneously as analyst and literary theorist. Jacques Lacan, founder
of the Societe Francaise de Psychanalyse and director of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris, has been
influential in post-modernist literary criticism. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAIVIMATOLOGY 1Xii-lXiii
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976) (1974), for the affinity between Den-ida and Lacan.
December 1994)	 DECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAW	 I
meaning, to yield the literary truth through the application of struc-
turalist methodology.
In Part A we have seen that structuralism introduced systematization
and analytical rigor in textual criticism. Part B explores structuralist
methodology and concludes that flaws of an absolutist and reduction-
istic nature offset structuralism's assets of systematization and analytical
rigor. These flaws were to cause structuralist scholars to adopt decon-
struction as a way of continuing to benefit from the high degree of
systematization and analytical rigor introduced by structuralism while
avoiding its negative attributes.
B. Structuralist Methodology
Structuralist methodology involves the categorization and percep-
tion of relations among units previously undifferentiated, thereby en-
riching the reader's understanding of the analyzed text. The funda-
mental unit for the literary structuralist is the sign. The Swiss linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure originated the notion of the sign in his 1915
Cours de linguistique generale, defining it as comprising a signifier and
a signified. The signifier is the word itself, the symbol of the concept
it represents, while the signified is the concept represented. The sig-
nifier, the sound, look and appearance of the word, has a purely
arbitrary connection to the signified: i.e., the identical signified is
represented by "chair" in one language and by "chaise" or "Stuhl" in
another. It could equally well be designated by "zair" or any other
signifier. 2° Saussure envisioned a systematic study of the interrelation
of signs, which he called "semiology," to address the problematic of
meaning by scientifically elucidating conventions which can be con-
fused with, and blind one to, meaning. 2 '
The point of departure for the structuralist enterprise of discov-
ering literary meaning is the text from which the author and authorial
intent have been banished as irrelevant. 22
 Every aspect of the text is
subject to a minute scrutiny, syntactical, semantic and linguistic in
nature. Relations which are parts of larger relations are studied as
20 See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURS nx LINGUISTIQUE GtNtRALE 100 (1915).
21 SAUSSURE, SWIM note 20, at 33. The focus on the interrelation of units is fundamental to
structuralist thought. See, e.g., Lgvi - STRAuss, supra note 18, at 211 ("[T]he true constituent units
of a myth are not the isolated relations but bundles of such relations and it is only as bundles that
these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning."); .see a/soymonsoN,
supra note 17, at 11 ("What is truly unifying are the relationships of foundation.").
22 See MICHAEL RIFFATERRE, Problemes d'analyse du style littiraire, in ESSAIS DE STYLIST1QUE
STRUCTURALE 95-112 (1971).
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"microcontexts" in "macrocontexts."23 Above all, literary structuralism
aspires to scientific rigor so as to distance itself from pre-structuralist
arbitrariness or impressionism: "Elle se doit, sous peine de sombrer dans
l'impressionisme, d'être formelle et structurale." 24
The "impressionism" to be avoided was, of course, the fluid, artis-
tic literary simulation of pre-structuralist days, in which the indissol-
uble union of author and text precluded certainty in literary analysis
by the inherently impossible attempt to read the author's mind. In the
structuralist view, the author is no more than a figment of the critic's
imagination which the critic then uses to formulate yet more interpre-
tations, forgetting that the author is only a personal invention. 25 Thus,
the text is the appropriate subject to study, in all its minutiae, from the
devising of novel units to excruciatingly detailed play with permuta-
tions and rearrangements of the units. By limiting analysis to the
textual, structuralism reifies literature, transforming it into a matter
which can be wholly apprehended after dissection, and which, most
importantly, is capable of being subjected to the rigors of scientific
analysis.
The structuralist concept of intertextuality, however, allows struc-
turalists an escape from a complete confinement to the text under
scrutiny. Intertextuality, the interrelatedness of texts, allows the struc-
turalist to incorporate external texts as part of the interpretive process
with respect to any given text. In place of the unknowable inner
thoughts of the author as an influence to be studied, structuralism
indirectly allows for authorial influences by validating prior and con-
temporaneous writings which the author is likely to have read. Finally,
structuralism devised the construct of an archreader, a hypothetical
reader defined as possessing cumulative knowledge of all relevant
textual-cultural influences contemporaneous to the time of the writing
of the text. 26 While purely biographical information about the author
remains excluded, the literary-cultural climate which the author brings
to writing gains admission through the dual fictions of intertextuality
and the archreader. 27
23 See id. at 68-91.
24
 "It owes itself, under penalty of sinking into impressionism, to be formal and structural."
Id. at 112 (my translation).
25 See, e.g., id. at 121 (my translation) ("[W]e use this imaginary construct—the creator at
work—to allow ourselves to formulate other interpretations, often forgetting, however, that the
author is of our own invention.").
26 This reader, known in French as Tarrhilecteur," has generally been called a "superreader"
in English. In my opinion, however, the normative connotations of "super" make "superreader"
an inaccurate translation of "archilecteur," whose primary connotation is quantitative in nature. I
therefore use "archreader" to designate "archiledeur."
21 Although, for the reasons set forth in the following pages, it is my opinion that the
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The use of intertextuality and of the archreader mitigates the
excesses of structuralism's formalism by validating the influence of
prior and contemporaneous texts on the reading of the particular text
under scrutiny. The creation of the archreader and intertextuality
represents an unavowed acknowledgment of the failure of the scientific
approach to literary analysis, however, for it signals that reliance on
methodology alone fails to fully illuminate texts. The formulaic cate-
gorizations fail to capture literary works."
In my opinion, the greatest flaw of structuralism in literary analysis
is its inherent suggestion of formulaic accuracy, when in fact the value
of its application (i.e., the extent to which a text is elucidated through
structuralist interpretation) is inseparable from, and dependent on,
the skill of the interpreter. Robert Scholes has noted this problem in
the context of the disagreement between two great literary structural-
ists, Michael Riffateire and Roman Jakobson, concerning the correct
interpretation of Baudelaire's "les Chats." Scholes rightly concludes
that the superiority of Riffaterre's interpretation does not reflect a
better developed theoretical framework but, rather, a superior individ-
ual reading.29
constructs of the archreader and intertextuality ultimately signal the failure of the structuralist
premise of the ascertainability of truth with respect to literary meaning, it should be remembered
that both intertextuality and the archreader are proper to structuralism's focus on relations
among units. As Culler has noted, "[s]tructuralists refuse . . . to treat terms as independent
entities ... [and] insist ... on the primacy of relations between terms." Culler, supra note 14, at
22-23; see also SCHOLES, supra note 16, at 4 ("Structuralism is a way of looking for reality not in
individual things but in the relationships among them."). In this respect, structuralism, like
deconstruction, is semiotic in its approach, for the semiotician derives meaning from all possible
relations among words.
For a critical view of structuralism as flawed by a conception of linguistic relations based on
word units, See RICHARD HARLAND, BEYOND SUPERSTRUCTURALISM (1993).
28 Scholes notes in particular that "[a]1t of the attempts of structuralists to derive narrative
form from logical categories emptied of semantic content have proved fruitless." SCIIOLES, supra
note 16, at 102.
29 Id. at 32. For the Riffaterre/Jakobson debate, see Roman Jakobson & Claude Levi-Strauss,
Charles Baudelaire's "les Chats" in 2 L'HoMME 5-21 (1962); Michael Riffaterre, Poetic Structures:
Two Approaches to "les Chats," in STRUCTURALISM 188-230 (Jacques Ehrmann ed., 1970). In my
own experience as a student of Riffaterre, his structuralist interpretations were overwhelmingly
persuasive and illuminating, each meticulously reasoned step inexorably leading, in conjunction
with all of the others, to the often wholly unexpected deep meaning of the literary text. One had
the feeling of reading well-known texts for the first time, of understanding thoroughly and
absolutely a palimpsest, entirely new and yet inextricably linked to the familiar surface text. To
listen to a presentation by Riffaterre was to become a confirmed believer in structuralism as the
methodological key to literary meaning. Colleagues of Riffaterre, however, although equally
enthusiastic proponents of structuralist methodology, often interpreted texts in an unenlighten-
ing and predictable manner. The difference, again, lay in the incomparably vaster literary and
cultural knowledge which Riffaterre qua individual reader brought to his interpretive undertakings.
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The structuralist problem is that structuralism's claim to validity
relies on the presumed accuracy of its methodology as the conduit to
the single, correct textual interpretation. If the tenets of structuralism
are correct, then a dispute as to methodological differences should
yield one correct and one incorrect literary interpretation. The Jakob-
son-Riffaterre conflict is distressing because the methodological frame-
works under dispute ultimately appear less relevant to the better inter-
pretation of Baudelaire's work than the individual, irreproducible talents
and cultural equipment of the individual interpreters." In scientific
terms, the problem is not that the application of mathematical formu-
lae yields a more brilliant proof by the mathematician with the more
inventive and insightful theorem, but, rather, that, in structuralism,
hypothesis and theorem are not linked by a proof at all. In mathemat-
ics, such a situation would mean that only hypothesis existed. Structu-
ralism's claimed equivalents to proofs and theorems are thus compro-
mised.
In scientific terms, structuralism in literature suffers from the
absence of a control to validate its results." In structuralism, the only
tangible is the literary text which triggers the analysis in the first place.
It cannot validate conclusions in any scientific manner. Confirmation
of the methodologically-reached interpretation can be derived only
from the intuitive sense of the reader that the true meaning has been
uncovered."
s°Adolf Grfinbauin has suggested a similar flaw in psychoanalysis, ascribing its benefits to
the therapist's "special vocabulary , knowledgeable manner, and the therapist's charisma,"
rather than to valid attributes of the theory. Amity GRONBAUM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS: A PHI LOSOPI MAL CRITIQUE 161 (1984).
51 Although Freud's work has been subject to similar criticism by hermeneuticists such as
Paul kiccieur and Jurgen Habermas, Adolf Grfinbaum compellingly argues that Freud was correct
in categorizing psychoanalysis as a natural science. Granbaurn concludes, however, that epistemic
flaws in the psychoanalytic method leave Freud's hypotheses unverified (but not unverifiable).
See id. For an excellent discussion of the lack of causal connection in Freud's work, and the
difference between causal connection and thematic kinship, see Adolf Grfinhaum, "Meaning"
Connections and Causal Connections in the Human Sciences: The Poverty of Hermeneutic Philosophy,
38 J. Am. PSYCHOANALYTIC Ass'm 559 (1989). For a discussion of the role of intuition in scientific
discoveries, see VICTOR WEISSKOPF, THE JOY OF INSIGHT: PASSIONS OF A PHYSICIST (1991).
52 There is a difference of opinion as to whether literary structuralists admit to the possibility
of more than one valid interpretation of a literary text Here I disagree with Scholes, who
interprets structuralist theory as allowing for multiple valid interpretations. See supra note 16. In
my opinion, the significance of the concepts of "convergence" and "surditermination" ("overdeter-
mination"), essential to literary structuralism, is that, cumulatively, the myriad elements of the
structuralist analysis must converge to yield one meaning, the sole true underlying meaning of
the text, compelled by the text under scrutiny when it is analyzed correctly. See RIFFATERRE, supra
note 22; MICHAEL RIFFATERRE, SEMIOTICS OF POETRY (1978). The philosophical implication of
such a methodology is, clearly, the knowability of truth.
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The merit of structuralism is the development of novel classifica-
tions of literary discourse, successfully transforming literary criticism
from ambling, evocative, pseudo-literature into a systematic methodol-
ogy, which, when applied by an interpreter of creativity and insight,
can produce an enriched and enlightening understanding of texts.
The flaw of structuralism is in making excessive claims. The mean-
ing of literary texts is not as absolute as structuralism would suggest.
The reader is not the pawn of the text, coerced, by means of latent
discursive mechanisms, to a single reading. A structuralist might reply
that the Riffaterrean archreader, that repository of the cumulative
knowledge of the period in which the text was written, solves the
problem of readers with varying degrees of literary familiarity. Since,
however, the archreader is a hypothetical construct, the attainment of
the single, overdetermined meaning derived from structuralist meth-
odology becomes an exercise in futility, with the corollary that literary
meaning ultimately is unascertainable and necessarily unverifiable.
In this section we have examined the positive and negative attrib-
utes of structuralist theory. In the next section, we will establish that
deconstruction was perceived as perpetuating structuralism's positive
qualities and avoiding its flaws.
Studying deconstruction's structuralist roots permits one to better
appreciate deconstruction on the one hand as a reaction against abso-
lutism rather than as a rejection of meaning or a denial of the existence
of truth, and, on the other hand, as a methodology for interpreting
texts, for which it was adopted in the United States, rather than as a
philosophy."
III. DECONSTRUCTION AND ITS METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Structuralism sought to displace the study of literature from the
purely humanistic to the scientific. One of the greatest ironies of
current criticism of deconstruction is that deconstruction is accused of
being unscientific and antiscientific. In fact, the methodological ap-
proach of deconstruction is as scientific in rigor and logic as that of
structuralism, and distinguishes both theories from previous literary
criticism. By adopting the attributes of scientific discourse, structuralist
literary criticism acquired a newly-found seriousness and entered the
ranks of the other structuralist fields considered by most scholars to
be sciences; namely, linguistics and anthropology.m
33 For the significance of the methodology/philosophy distinction see infra notes 42-61 and
accompanying text.
34 This may indeed have been one of the attractions of structuralism to émigré scholars
chagrined at the relatively lower value accorded by American society to literature and literary
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The deconstructionist technique is similar. It involves intense scru-
tiny of all textual elements, including a study of textual presences by
the evocation of textual absences. It also involves the derivation of
meaning through the opposition of textual components to non-textual
equivalents which the actual text displaced and whose presence is
evoked through their differentiation from the signs selected by the
author for textual presence.55 The deconstructionist enterprise differs
from the structuralist's in that deconstruction allows for more than
scholars. French or French-trained academics predominated among the original structuralists
and deconstructionists in the United States. Significantly, as Alice Kaplan has indicated, "fi]n
French the adjective scientifique' is often applied to literary research." ALICE KAPLAN, FRENCH
LESSONS 121 (1993). For an interesting analogy in legal education, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 19805 (1983), and Myron
Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 421 LEGAL Enuc. 241, 242
(1992) (explaining the adoption of the case method as a means of introducing the "scientific
method" into legal education and thereby upgrading what was, before 1870, legal education's
"second-class status in the university community."). See also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy,
45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983). For a discussion of larger societal motivations to scientize the law,
see MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977). For a
discussion of the validation of science in Western philosophy and attendant efforts to scientize,
see TOM SORELL, SCIENTISM: PHILOSOPHY AND THE INFATUATION WITH SCIENCE (1991).
35
 As Merleau-Ponty has explained, according to Saussure:
taken singly, signs do not specify anything, and . . . each one of them does not so
much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other
signs. Since the same can be said for all other signs, we may conclude that language
is made up of differences without terms; or more exactly, that the terms of language
are engendered only by the differences which appear among them.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 39 (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964). For a compelling
demonstration of the importance of absence (the subtextual corollary of the primordial "differ-
ence"), see Balkin, supra note 7, at 746 (noting Derrida's dissatisfaction with Western philosophy
for being biased towards "a metaphysics of presence"). See also GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES
122 (1989) (describing absence as deconstruction's "counter-theology").
Structuralism's and deconstruction's debts to Saussure are clearly reflected in the signi-
ficance which both attribute to the derivation of meaning through difference and absence.
According to Saussure, meaning results from both syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (i.e.,
the horizontal relations of signs resulting from their position within a group (syntagmatic), and
the vertical relations of textual signs to words which, although unexpressed, are evoked by
relations such as synonymity or antonymy to unexpressed signs, often with contrasting connota-
tions (paradigmatic)). See SAUSSURE, supra note 20, at 170-75. Existentialist philosophy similarly
portrays the interdependence of absence and presence, defining each in terms of the other. This
concept is developed in LITRE ET LE MANT, in which Sartre also presents Heidegger's, Hegel's
and Husserl's related theories. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, LITRE ET LE NEANT 288-310 (1947). Balkin
demonstrates a similarity of approach in Hohfeld, whom he views as the first legal semiotician.
SeeJ.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990).
For further discussion of the connection between deconstruction and structuralism, see
JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM Ak 1ER STRUCTURALISM (1982).
Culler goes so far as to conclude that "[a] scrupulous discussion of criticism focusing on the
difference between structuralism and post-structuralism would have to conclude that structuralists
generally resemble post-structuralists more closely than many post-structuralists resemble one
another." Id. at 30.
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one valid textual interpretation. While structuralist interpretation re-
veals the immense complexity of textual analysis through the scrutiny
of myriad elements of signification, the structuralist interpretation
differs from the deconstructionist in that the former yields only one
viable interpretation. Where structuralism devalorizes the non-textual,
deconstruction valorizes the reader's contribution qua interpreter in
creating the interpretation from the point of departure of the multi-
tude of relations of signification engendered by the text." Both struc-
turalism and deconstruction eschew authorial intention; but, where
structuralism views relevant context as finite, deconstruction views it as
boundless, Where structuralists believe that their methodology yields
the truth of the text, deconstructionists believe that their analysis yields
a meaning which is interpretive in nature. Where structuralism puts
the self outside of the text, deconstruction places the self within it.s7
Where structuralist interpretation yields an absolutist result, de-
constructionist analysis constitutes a refusal of absolutism. It is not in
scrutinizing and unearthing previously unperceived contradictions that
deconstruction differs from structuralism; it is, rather, in announcing
the coexistence of contradiction at both the surface and the deep levels
of texts. Thus, while the structuralist objective of uncovering the text's
underlying meaning through the application of structuralist method-
ology implies the accessibility of truth," the deconstructionist focus on
inherent contradiction and paradox does not. Deconstruction does
not take a position as to whether truth exists. It is, rather, a dialectical
movement."
This does not imply, however, that deconstruction focuses its analytical scrutiny randomly.
See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
97 See Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte C'est Moi" The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1640-47 (1990) (arguing that to do otherwise is to
decimate deconstruction). I do not agree, however, with Schlag's more general view of decon-
struction as far more than an interpretive methodology.
38
 The idea was perhaps best expressed by Levi-Strauss, describing the structuralist enterprise
as "an internal cohesion . . . inaccessible if one observes an isolated system, [which] reveals itself
in the study of transformations, thanks to which one finds similar attributes in systems which
appear to be different." CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, LECON 1NAUGURALE 27 (1965) (my translation).
See also TZVETAN TODOROV, GRAMMAIRE DU DECAMERON 15 (1959), for the concept of a universal
grammar which underlies all language because it is in accordance with the structure of the
universe. See also CULLER, supra note 35, at 22 ("Structuralists are convinced that systematic
knowledge is possible; post-structuralists claim to know only the impossibility of this knowledge.");
SC HOLES, supra note 16, at 2 (characterizing structuralism as "a response to the need . . . for a
'coherent system' that would unite the modern sciences and make the world habitable for man
again.").
39 See Derrida, supra note 4, at 931 (`This questioning of foundation is neither foundationalist
nor anti-foundationalist.").
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Derrida's writings are sufficiently varied and elusive to provide some
apparent textual support for the view that deconstruction is antifoun-
dationalist. My conclusion that deconstruction is not antifoundation-
alist similarly derives from Derrida's writings. I also base my conclusion
on my view that deconstruction's entry into American intellectual
thought as structuralism's successor puts into historical perspective
deconstruction's most significant contribution to both literary and
legal analysis: its dual renunciation of structuralism's reductionistic
premises of (1) the existence and ascertainability of only one correct
textual interpretation; and (2) the devalorization and exclusion of the
non-textual.°
The admission of not having penetrated to an ultimate truth has
been endemic to scientific progress:
Previously the urge for an understanding of the world in
which we live met with general mythological, religious, and
philosophical ideas that delivered "holistic" answers to .. .
fundamental questions . . . . The answers were directed at the
totality of phenomena, attempting to account for everything.
Then, a few centuries ago, human curiosity took a different
turn ... General questions were . . . replaced by limited ones.
However, detailed answers created a framework for the un-
derstanding of more general questions. Only a renunciation
of immediate contact with the "one and absolute truth," only
endless detours through the diversity of experience allowed
the methods of science to become more fundamental."
The controversy as to whether deconstruction renounces absolut-
ism or whether it denies the existence of truth depends on the resolu-
tion of another issue: whether deconstruction is a methodology or a
philosophy. Although the concepts of methodology and philosophy
cannot be separated in a mathematical manner as if they were distinct
sets, devoid of points of intersection, 42 I believe that deconstruction is
4" For the contrary view that structuralism is not reductive, see SCHOLES, supra note 16, at
41. My use of "non-textual" here is the traditional one, not the deconstructionist usage embracing
everything within the concept of text; pursuant to the latter usage, one could say that deconstruc-
tion also excludes the non-textual, since everything is text. cf. DERMA, supra note 19, at 163
(my translation) ("Il n'y a pm de hors-texten—"There is nothing outside of the text.").
41
 WEISSKOPF, supra note 31, at 314.
42
 This view has been criticized by those who believe that the two are entirely separable. "Men
like Jean Piaget and Roland Barthes insist that structuralism is an activity or a method, not an
ideology." SCHOLES, supra note 16, at 197. On the whole, 1 agree with Piaget and Barthes
inasmuch as the appropriate relevance of both structuralism and deconstruction is concerned. 1
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a methodology and that its ideological or philosophical implications
appropriately extend to a debunking of absolutism, and, equally ap-
propriately, apply to nonscientific fields, but that deconstruction does
not deny the existence of truths or the value of logocentrism, which,
moreover, it adopts in its own discourse."
The debate often has been framed in misleading terms by decon-
struction's critics, as well as by its antifoundationalist proponents, in
that the existence of philosophical implications need not imply a
universal applicability to those implications. Owen Fiss premises his
criticism of deconstruction as nihilistic on deconstruction's universality
of application." The view that deconstruction's application to legal
interpretation can be equated with a nihilistic denial of the possibility
of truth incorrectly assumes that the legal field, like the natural sci-
ences, is amenable to verifiable conclusions. Fiss contrasts literature
and law, stating that deconstructionist analysis is appropriate only for
literature.45 Rather, deconstruction qua methodology (albeit method-
ology with philosophical implications) applies to both law and litera-
ture because it introduces a logocentric rigor helpful to the elucidation
disagree, however, in that both methodologies are to some extent inseparable from ideological
or philosophical implications.
43 I am not alone in this view, although it is hotly contested by deconstruction's critics in the
legal field (as well as by some of its antifoundationalist proponents in the legal field). See Balkin,
supra note 7, at 745-46 ("Derrida and his followers insist that deconstruction is not a philosophi-
cal position but rather a practice."). Balkin further notes that "`[cl]econstruction is ... an activity
of reading which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up
independently as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts.'" Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER NORRIS,
DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 31 (1982)); see also Steven L. Winter, "Bull Durham"
and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990). Pierre Schlag, one of deconstruction's
antifoundationalist proponents who disagrees with this view, has written that "[t]he error here is
the homogenization and neutralization of the different subversiveness of deconstruction through
its assimilation with approaches that have already been reduced to the status of mere theories,
techniques, methods, etc." Schlag, supra note 37, at 1657. Even Schlag, however, comes close to
acknowledging the logocentrism of deconstructionist discourse: "Derridean deconstruction is a
participation in the philosophical enterprise; Derrida writes in a manner cognizable by the
discipline of philosophy . . ." Id. at 1650. Elsewhere, however, Schlag maintains that the use of
logocentrism by postmodernists does not constitute an endorsement, and implies that it need
not undermine anti-logocentrism; "Postmodernists are quite likely to take the demonstration of
a paradox in their text as in and of itself evidence of weakness or flaw." Pierre Schlag, Normative
and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 17411.18 (1990). To borrow nomenclature from Lehman,
Schlag is a "hard-core deconstructionist," while Balkin and I are "soft-core deconstructionists."
LEHMAN, Supra note 3, at 118.
"See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
45 See id.; see also RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 215
(1988) ("The relevance of all this for the law is obscure . . . the purposes and techniques of
authors of literary texts are different from those of the authors of legal texts.") (quoted in Schlag,
supra note 37, at 1636 n.10).
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of fields like literature, law, and the social sciences, by producing
conclusions in those areas that elude scientific verification: 46
Where the meaning or content of the terms of a conceptual
opposition is in flux, or not fully determined, it is possible to
discover within each term possible versions or interpretations
of that term that bear similarities to the principles associated
with the opposite term. Since legal, ethical, and political
concepts have this contestable and incomplete character, it is
Winter discusses the increasing use in legal analysis of ideas from other disciplines as
symptomatic of our being in a time of crisis: At such times [of crisis], the most useful strategy
will be to look outside one's interpretive community for models and schemes that might help
reconceptualize the problems that have proven recalcitrant to the old paradigm." Winter, supra
note 43, at 679. My own view is that the tremendous surge in interdisciplinary scholarship reflects
the mammoth strides in knowledge of the modern era which, in turn, have elucidated previously
unrecognized connections among various disciplines, obfuscating disciplinary distinctions.
46
 Niels Bohr's concept of complementarity is apposite here. As recorded by Victor Weisskopf,
an MIT physicist and former colleague of Bohr's, Bohr originally used the term "complementar-
ity" for the apparent contradiction between two mutually exclusive properties of an electron (wave
and particle) which the electron nevertheless displayed under varying conditions. Bohr then
"generalized the idea of complementarity to fields of human experience outside of physics, such
as ethics, music, art, and religion," signalling "the importance of different, even seemingly
contradictory avenues to human experience." WEISSKOPF, supra note 31, at 66. Weisskopf con-
cludes that
[dada complementary approach has a specific kind of discourse: it appears lucid and
concise within its own intrinsic scale of values but fragile and indefinite when judged
by the peculiar requirements of a complementary approach . . . We must use them all
to understand the full significance of our experience. Unfortunately, most people
resist the complementary view of things. There is a trend toward clear-cut, univer-
sally valid answers, excluding different approaches.
Id. at 326 (emphasis added). Although the Bohr-Weisskopf approach bears a superficial resem-
blance to Rorty's idea of multiple discourses, see, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE (1979), Rorty, unlike Weisskopf, reduces reason itself to a mere social
phenomenon. For an overview of the applicability of Rorty's theory to legal discourse, see John
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1986).
See also Jack M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE W. 1669,1672-73 (1990) (book review),
for an excellent discussion of the distinction between conceptual opposition and logical contra-
diction, refuting the accusation by John Ellis in AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989) that a decon-
structionist claim of a simultaneous "neither P or not-P" and "P and not-P" constitutes a defiance
of traditional logic and an abandonment of logocentrism. As Balkin shows, the above proposition
no longer contains a logical contradiction if P signifies properties whose significance is derived
from relations of similarity and difference—i.e., whose significance is contextual. Balkin, supra,
at 1672-78. I am grateful to Steven Winter for suggesting to me the relevance of work in cognitive
psychology; in particular, George Eakoffs Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, which debunks "the
view of reason as the disembodied manipulation of symbols[,]" and proposes a shift from the
classical view of categories to a prototype theory of categories arising out of human biological
capacities, experience and imagination. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS
8 (1987). Lahoff s results echo those of deconstruction: "[N]ot chaos, but an expanded perspec-
tive on human reason, one which by no means requires imprecision or vagueness in scientific
inquiry." Id. at 11.
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often possible to discover traces of their opposites in disputes
over their meaning and interpretation.47
American legal scholars who oppose the use of deconstruction
view deconstructionist methodology as random in application: i.e., as
being applied to any legal text for no reason other than to debunk and
destroy, rather than as focused on texts for discernible reasons gener-
ated by textual attributes.
Derrida has made clear that deconstruction is applied in response
to textual components: "[Deconstruction is an] incision, precisely [be-
cause] it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of
rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed." 48
Moreover, in his keynote speech at the 1990 "Deconstruction and the
Possibility of Justice" colloquium at Cardozo Law School, Derrida again
made clear that the deconstructionist exploration of meaning through
hierarchy reversal is not imposed randomly, but, rather, on those word
combinations whose juxtapositions draw the attention of the decon-
structionist to the likelihood of rich interpretive possibilities. 49
47 Balkin, supra note 46, at 1685. See also Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A
Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2016 (1985), where Leff writes the following:
First, it is a fundamental tenet of most systems of justice that identical things be
treated identically . . . . Second, there is no such thing as an identical thing;
everything is what it is and not something else. Hence a large part of doing justice
consists of trying to treat "similar" things, i.e., things "essentially," or "really" iden-
tical the same, i.e., in analogizing one thing to another such that they should be
treated as if they were "the same."
But what "counts" in the way of similarity or difference? There is always some
similarity and some difference . . . . When is something so like something else that
it should be treated the same, or so unlike that it should not. The key answer is
that there is no simple "logical" or linguistic" answer, no general set of classificatory
criteria for making these decisions.
48JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 41 (1981). Balkin characterizes this attribute of deconstruc-
tion as invariably "parasitic on some form of logocentric practice." J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal,
and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. RE:v. 1613, 1629 (1990). Balkin's view of decon-
struction, like mine, is of "an analytic tool." Balkin, supra note 7, at 786.
49 Derrida, supra note 4, at 939; see also DERRIDA, supra note 19, at 158 (discussing the
necessity of reading in accordance with the "classical exigencies" as the "task of reading"). Thus,
for example, in explicating Montaigne, Derrida focuses on the unusual phrase "legitimate fiction"
in Montaigne's statement that "our law even has, it is said, legitimate fictions on which it bases
the truth of its justice" precisely because the unexpectedness of the juxtaposition of legitimacy
and fiction suggest the line of rupture" which signals to the deconstructionist that critical reading
may yield a signifying structure which is not immediately apparent. Derrida, supra note 4, at 939
(my translation); see DERRIDA, supra note 19, at lxxv:
If in the process of deciphering a text in the traditional way we come across a word
that seems to harbor an unresolvable contradiction, and by virtue of being oneword
is made sometimes to work in one way and sometimes in another and thus is made
to point away from the absence of a unified meaning, we shall catch at that word.
If a metaphor seems to suppress its implications, we shall catch at that metaphor.
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Derrida unequivocally affirms that law is deconstructible. His rea-
soning underlines those aspects of law which differentiate it from the
natural sciences: "because it is founded on interpretable and trans-
formable textual strata ... because its ultimate foundation is by definition
unfounded."5° Thus, it is clear that not everything is deconstructible,
and that the deconstructionist does not approach a text unless textual
components suggest a latent, unperceived correlation between its sur-
face components and its meaning. 51
Equally fallacious is the accusation that deconstruction valorizes
all interpretations. 52 Derrida states that the interpretive process "can-
not be executed however one wishes," and that it must follow "proto-
cols of reading."" Derrida cautions that a failure to respect the "clas-
sical exigencies" [which form the "task of reading"] would be valueless
because "critical production would risk developing in any direction at all
and authorize itself to say almost anything."54 Thus, deconstruction's
departure from structuralism in validating multiple interpretations
does not mean that it sanctions all interpretations, since the text
engenders only a certain (or perhaps, rather, uncertain) number of
valid interpretations, and since, according to Derrida, "our reading
must be intrinsic and remain within the text."55
We shall follow its adventures through the text and see the text coming undone as
a structure of concealment, revealing its self-transgression, its undecidability.
See also lialkin, supra note 7, at 443-44, for the principle that deconstruction is "not simply a
fancy way of sticking out your tongue" or a "trashing," but, rather, a method of "teasing out the
hidden antinomies in our language and thought."
"Derrida, supra note 4, at 943-44. In the same passage, Derrida also refers to "the history
of law" as law's "possible and necessary transformation [and] sometimes its amelioration." Id.; see
also Steven L. Winter, Far What It's Worth, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 789,811 (1992) (deconstruction
supports undecidability rather than indeterminacy).
Hart defined "the great anomaly of legal language [as] our inability to define its crucial
words in terms of ordinary factual counterparts." HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, DEFINITION
AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE 7-8 (1953). It should be noted that Hart was a formalist who did
not view this non-referemiality of legal discourse as emanating from a socio-political context but,
rather, considered it part of a self-referential system. My favorite critic of deconstruction, however,
is the non-lawyer, George Steiner, who writes that "Id]econstruction can be defined as an elabo-
ration on Gertrude Stein's boutade 'There's no there there.'" STEINER, supra note 35, at 121.
51
 See also J.M. Balkin, 'Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1131,1144 (1994) ("[E]very good deconstructor picks his targets carefully."); STEINER, supra note
35, at 929 Mt was normal, foreseeable, desirable that studies of deconstructive style should
culminate in the problematic of law (druit), of law and justice .... [I]t is even the most proper
place for them [i.e., deconstructive studies].").
52 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 8, at 233, for the criticism that deconstruction undermines
stability because "whatever a reader says is 'correct.'"
53 DERRIDA, supra note 48, at 63.
54 DERRIDA, supra note 19, at 158 (emphasis added); see alSO JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED, INC.
144-45 (S. Weber trans., 1988) ("I have never accepted saying . . . just anything at all.").
55 DERRIDA, supra note 19, at 159. The lapse in logic of deconstruction's critics in claiming
that deconstruction's valorization of multiple interpretations is an indiscriminate valorization of
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Although criticism of deconstruction frequently dwells on its al-
leged antifoundationalism, the very critics who condemn antifounda-
tionalism call for a repudiation of deconstruction on grounds unre-
lated to deconstruction's validity.
Thus, Hegland argues that "our world would be made worse if we
all came to believe that the Rule of Law is illusion." 56 And Fiss, equating
deconstruction with nihilism, argues that "it threatens our social exist-
ence and the nature of public life as we know it in America; and it
demeans our lives."57 The argument against deconstruction is, thus,
that it is undesirable, not that it is invalid, and the proponents of
foundationalism eschew logocentric debate as to deconstruction's va-
lidity while simultaneously advocating that deconstruction be shunned
for its own alleged failure to adhere to foundationalist precepts.
Fiss argues that deconstructionists interpret the Constitution as
having no meaning: "The roots of this alternative version of nihilism
are not clear to me, but its significance is unmistakable. The great
public text of modern America, the Constitution, would be drained of
meaning."58 Fiss incorrectly equates multiple valid interpretations (which
a deconstructionist analysis does yield) with meaninglessness. He also
incorrectly interprets deconstruction as conferring unlimited freedom
on the interpreter to fabricate any meaning whatsoever.59 Rather, de-
construction is an interpretive process carefully applied to texts at their
"points of rupture," where textual elements, either express or evoked,
trigger the deconstructive analysis; nor, as we have seen, are all mean-
ings equally valid.'"
all interpretations seems too egregious to require formal refutation. See Rolando Gaete, Herme-
neutic& Popperism and the Play of Justice, 20 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SEMIOTIQUE JURIDIQUE
115, 120 (1994), for the view that, according to Derrida, "there is a threshold of truth beyond
which interpretations become excessive." Gaete suggests that the threshold is crossed when an
interpretation addresses elements of a text but renders other parts incoherent. He cites Eco's use
of an example of bad reading, taken from Borges: "[W]hy not read Kempis' IMITATION OF CHRIST
as if it were written by Celine? Because this kind of reading 'offers a suitable "grid" for very few
sentences of the IMITATION' while reading the book according to Christian medieval codes makes
it fully coherent." Id. at 119 (quoting UMBERTO Eco, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION 59-60
(1990)).
58 Hegland, supra note 7, at 1205.
57 Fiss, supra note 44, at 763.
58 Id.
5• See id. at 74-4.
6' ) See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 431 LEGAL EDGE. 27 (1993), for the
argument that the dialogue between adherents of traditional and postmodernist jurisprudential
approaches will lead to new insights in jurisprudential theory. The deconstructionist fascination
with the interplay of words and their multiplicity of meanings has inspired analogies to play. See
MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE &FRANCOIS OST, LE DRorr ou LES PARADOXES Du Jr.0 (1992); Francois
Ost, Entre Ordre et desordre: le jeu du droit, 31 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE ntr DROIT 133 (1986).
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Deconstruction's critics have jumped from the Saussurian premise
that language is fluid and inconstant to the conclusion that, for the
deconstructionist, it is pointless to search for meaning. The deconstruc-
tive approach, however, elucidates the oppositions embedded within
propositions. The text becomes a fertile terrain, yielding meaning and
more meaning and requiring the interpreter to accommodate incom-
patible elements of signification. None of this, however, implies an
absence of meaning. 61
A still larger historical perspective is necessary for a full appraisal
of deconstruction's character as stopping short of antifoundationalism
and its role in Western, and, more particularly, French, intellectual
tradition despite its focus on antinomy. Deconstruction is a post-World
War II phenomenon which signals the end of the Enlightenment belief
that human Civilization is perfectible through scientific advancement
and the progressive acquisition of knowledge. The next section ex-
plores deconstruction as symbolizing the end of the Enlightenment
and rejects the view of critics that deconstruction is defeatist or nihil-
istic. Rather, deconstruction illuminates the lack of reliable founda-
tions to our jurisprudential system, a situation which both poses a
challenge to the legitimacy of adjudication and implies that the per-
petuation of our system is uncertain and insecure.
IV. DECONSTRUCTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
The lesson of Hitler's extermination camps and Stalin's gulag was
that the century's enormous advances in knowledge, once envisioned
as the underpinnings of an ever more civilized social order, at best had
proved irrelevant in preventing human barbarity and carnage of an
unprecedented scale, and, at worst, had been subverted to purposes of
torture and slaughter.
Deconstruction in essence incorporates nonlinearity into its vision
of human progression. Building on the anterior foundations of Freudi-
anism and existentialism, deconstruction represents the acknowledg-
Carte demonstrates, however, that viewing the interpretation of legal discourse as play does not
undermine either the seriousness of the enterprise or its rule-based character. See Gaete, supra
note 55.
®i Indeed, "(a]ltbough he is often accused of being an apostle of meaningless, what is truly
disturbing about Derrida is that he finds too much meaning . ." Stephens, supra note 4, at 24.
Winter suggests that "[from a postmoderr[ist] perspective, the predicament is not that there
are no foundations but that there are too many .... It is the resulting profusion of meaning ...
that leads to the problems of interpretability and undecidability so emphasized by postmod-
ernists." Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forth-
coming 1994).
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ment that humankind must rely on itself for advances in civilization,
but that, when we fail to apply painstaking scrutiny to surface phenom-
ena, we do so at the peril of blindness to prevarications which may be
embedded within propositions. Deconstruction is not synonymous with
either nihilism or despair; rather, it is the response of the lucid thinker
in the latter half of the twentieth century to the challenge of social
progress in a world which only recently emerged from the totalitarian
yoke and which still must find its way under the threat of nuclear
extinction.62
To say that deconstruction promulgates despair is akin to saying
that Picasso's Guernica and Schemberg's atonal music promulgate dis-
sonance and cacophony, or that Ionesco's theater and Robbe-Grillet's
novels promote absurdity and chaos. Modern intellectual and artistic
movements are not a battle against hope, progress and beauty. Rather,
they represent reality as it is perceived in our time, lacking in inherent
harmony, order and predictability. Deconstructionists do not renounce
hopes of justice and civilization; they engage in the task of seeking to
reach truth without accepting surface representations in place of real-
ity, an undertaking suited to advancing those goals. In highlighting
internal paradoxes and the complexity of subtextual messages, decon-
struction reveals the extent to which meaning is complicated and
varied and the concomitant need for skepticism in the face of those
who claim to possess truth.°
62 For a more thorough response to the accusation that deconstruction is a philosophy of
despair, see infra part IV. For the view of modernity as haunted by the holocaust, see VLADIMIR
JANKELEVITCH & &PATRICE BERLOWITZ, QUELQUE PART DANS L'INACHEVt 67 (1978) (my transla-
tion):
In fact the extermination of six million Jews is the invisible bad conscience of all
of modernity: it weighs on all of our contemporaries like an overwhelming secret,
whether or not they be aware of it and even if they feel no remorse for it .... Those
who deny that nameless thing or who simulate speaking of other things, those who
do not think of it, even those who rejoice about it, if such a kind exists, they are all
inhabited by the unavowable secret
See also RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 145
(1992) (eschewing the term "postmodern" in favor of "post-Holocaust," stating the latter to be
"a term I prefer to postmodern"). See David Suchoff, Introduction to ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, THE
IMAGINARY JEW XVii (Kevin O'Neill & David Suchoff trans., 1994) (1980), for
the underlying sense that an absent presence–the Holocaust as ruptural yet unspo-
ken force–stands behind the proliferating images and discourses of postwar cultural
thought. It was Theodor Adorno who argued that Auschwitz was the central event
of our age; Shoshana Felman, Claude Lanzmann and others have more recently
suggested that the need and simultaneous impossibility of narrating the Holocaust
remain the informing and unattended event of contemporary culture.
63 In support of this position, see Winter, supra note 61 ("Social contingency, therefore, is
the precondition for truth—not its enemy.").
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The harshest opponents to the use of deconstruction in legal
analysis are those who correctly see that it implies an absence of
reliable, objectively justifiable, criteria to guarantee justice in our juris-
prudential system. If the American jurisprudential system's survival to
date cannot be correlated with inviolable, objectively compelled and
logically sound principles, not only does the legitimacy of adjudication
become questionable, but so too does the future survival of the rule
of law. I believe that the furious controversy engendered by deconstruc-
tion results from a correct perception (frequently unarticulated and
perhaps not always conscious) that, because deconstruction will show
the fallibility, the illogic, the contradictions embedded in the tenets of
our legal system, we cannot rely on those tenets for the perpetuation
of our system.
Such a concept is not new or even radical, but it is painful, for it
means that our social order and laws exist in a state of permanent
precariousness. It means that our Constitution and system of adjudica-
tion do not make us immune from the lawless forces which gained
ascendancy in other countries in our century, bringing in their wake
a terrifying toll of human misery and waste. Two centuries ago, Hobbes
recognized the fragility and con textuality of all governmental systems.
In Leviathan, Hobbes compellingly describes the inherent precarious-
ness of social orders due to the inalterable complexity of human
nature. 64 In Hobbes' view, the rule of law and states of peace inevitably
are transient and insecure phenomena whose preservation must be
safeguarded with relentless vigilance.
A corollary benefit to be derived from deconstruction is an appreciation of multiple views.
Richard Rorty has criticized deconstruction for its failure to advance utopian alternatives. See
RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 16 (1991). On
another level, however, deconstructionist analysis provides an ideal vehicle for promoting the
multiculturalism which Rorty believes to be the only hope for transcending contextuality, or as
he puts it, one's inability to step outside of one's own mind. See id. at 14. The method which
Rorty envisages is quintessentially deconstructionist: "Not a process of setting aside our old
vocabularies, beliefs and desires but rather of gradually adding to and modifying them by playing
them off against each other." Id.; see also CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING 20 (1979)
("It is only through difference that progress has been made.").
m For his conclusion that no specific system can represent a universal ideal, Hobbes has been
viewed as a pessimist. See Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE 21-38 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989), for the view that the emphasis on preventing harm
from befalling the individual constitutes a liberalism of feat" In Shklar's view, however, the
authoritarianism of Hobbes' proposal precludes liberalism. For the contrary view of Hobbes as a
liberal, see DENNIS FL WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES SOCIETY
(1994); Mark V. Tush net, Following the Rules Laid Down—A Critique of Intmpretivism and Neutral
Principles, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 194-95 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux
eds., 1988).
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The Hobbesian view runs counter to the Enlightenment view of
Mill65 in England and of Montesquieu and Diderot in France, who
expected human civilization to be perfectible in tandem with growing
scientific understanding. 66
The Hobbesian view has been borne out by the history of our
century.° Nonetheless, the human instinct to search for security and
to deny the inevitability of a permanent state of insecurity is as indomi-
table and intrinsic to human nature as are the forces, equally funda-
mental to human nature and human societies, which wreak havoc on
stability, peace and the rule of law. 68
The threat of deconstruction is the threat of life without a blue-
print. Others have pointed out that deconstruction is a difficult the-
ory.69 Yet those who oppose it in the legal field are among the most
brilliant of thinkers. Their readiness to condemn deconstruction with-
out engaging in a debate on its merits is just the sort of "point of
rupture" which signals to a deconstructionist that more is at stake than
what appears on the surface.
Deconstruction does not imply the impossibility of a rule of law.
It does, however, imply the absence of objectively valid underpinnings
to our jurisprudential system, which would serve as internal safeguards
for its perpetuation. In my opinion, the anti-deconstructionist urge to
avoid assessing the validity of deconstructionist analysis, i.e., the nota-
ble absence of attempts to demonstrate logical fallacies in deconstruc-
tionist analyses, stems from a wish to deny the sobering conclusion that
SeejOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1926).
66 See, e.g., OTIS FELLOWS & NORMAN TORREY, THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 12 (1970)
("[T]he idea of progress [was] the dominant spirit of the age."). For an analysis of both Hobbes
and Freud as Enlightenment liberals, see WRONG, supra note 64.
67 In this context, Derrida's comment about deconstruction reflects his sense of the theory's
being premised on an apprehension of human nature: "[D]econstruction ... belongs to the
structure of history or events. It started before the academic phenomenon of deconstruction,
and it will continue with other names." Stephens, supra note 4, at 25 (quoting Jacques Derricks).
65 One of those who continues to try to formulate a political philosophy capable of withstand-
ing the vicissitudes of time is John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). It should be noted that even Rawls' liberalism, although it
strives for an inalterable and secure agenda of fundamental rights, nevertheless approaches the
Hobbesian view in espousing a liberalism exclusively political as an ideal; i.e., an ideal which
addresses societal structures and can encompass conflicting views of what is beneficial for indi-
viduals. For an analysis of the psychological difficulties caused by freedom and the human urge
to find safety and reliability through blueprints, see Esucli FROMM, ESCAYE FROM FREEDOM
(1967), and Esucu FRomm, THE SANE SOCIETY (1955).
65 E.g., Stephens, supra note 4, at 24 ("Ws hard to do it well. What it wants is a kind of intense
struggle with a text to dig out things the text doesn't know it's saying. People with average
imagination ... couldn't do it. You have to be really smart,") (quoting Leo Damrosch, chairman
of Harvard's English department).
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it is not our jurisprudential system which has spared the United States
the horrors which have befallen so many others in this century. Equally
frightening is the conclusion that our jurisprudential system cannot
reliably ensure our future safety. The anti-deconstructionist charge that
deconstruction is a philosophy of despair is a normative statement,
neither establishing its own truth nor justifying the conclusion that
deconstruction is invalid. Hegland is typical in framing the issue pre-
scriptively, stating as an argument against deconstruction that he sup-
ports the rule of law." Deconstruction, however, does not oppose the
rule of law. 71 Deconstruction suggests, rather, that the contextuality
and inherent contradictions of jurisprudential concepts eliminate what
appears to be our last bulwark against the tides of lawlessness which
often before have swept the forces of humanism into oblivion."
"Hegland, supra note 7, at 1220.
71 Some of deconstruction's proponents are and-foundationalists, and would disagree with
my characterization of deconstruction and its implications. For the opposing view, see, e.g.,
Drucilla Cornell, The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice, in WoutuNG THROUGH
DERRIDA 80 (Gary Madison ed., 1993). See also CULLER, supra note 35, at 133, arguing that
ultimate indeterminacy need not invalidate analysis:
In mathematics, for example, GrOdel's demonstration of the incompleteness of
mathematics (the impossibility of constructing a theoretical system within which all
true statements of number theory are theorems) does not lead mathematicians to
abandon their work. The humanities, however, often seem touched with the belief
that a theory which asserts the ultimate indeterminacy of meaning makes all effort
pointless.
George Steiner refines this point by noting that meaning may be indeterminate but nevertheless
investigable
[T]he mathematical and natural sciences . . . are based on this very distinction.
Sub-atomic physics, the cosmology of black holes, can move forward despite, indeed
in the playful light of, the indeterminacy principle and the fact that our acts of
observation 'dissolve' the observed phenomena. Mathematics and mathematical
logic can get on with their high, pure games though they know that no axiomatic
system can ever be proved to be fully coherent and consistent from within its own
rules and postulates . .
STEINER, supra note 35, at 125. My own view is that deconstruction does not preach indetermi-
nacy, but, rather, as Winter has noted, undecidability. Winter, supra note 50, at 811 (citing
DERRIDA, supra note 54, at 148). In my view, it is applicable to fields which are not amenable to
the "purity" in reasoning which Steiner describes. Drucilla Cornell notes that "[t]he asserted
impossibility of naming the 'Law' ... should not be confused with the complete rejection of the
ethical. If anything unites deconstructive critics it is, ironically, their insistence . . on the
inevitability of the ethical in reading . . . ." Drucilla Cornell, Post-Structuralism, the Ethical Rela-
tion, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1587, 1590 (1988); see also Denis J. Brion, Performing the
Constitution, 49 WASH. & Lee L. Rev. 293, 320 (1992) ("The Rule of Law problem of autonomy
is not solved by seeking stability in meaning; rather, it is solved by seeking instability in meaning.
This is the best guarantee against a tyranny of ideology.").
72 Hegland, for one, is aware of his motives, conceding that, although he "hates to admit to
being suspicious, fearful and perhaps, even mean-spirited[,] [y]et, we live in a century that has
produced Hitler and Stalin." Hegland, supra note 7, at 1220. His view is that deconstructionist
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France during the Second World War presents a vivid example of
a nation, like ours, with a long history of egalitarianism, protection of
refugees, religious tolerance and constitutional protection of human
rights." On July 10, 1940, after the German defeat of France, a century
and a half of Enlightenment values instilled in French legal tradition
and embodied in its Constitution collapsed. Five hundred and sixty-
nine legislators out of six hundred and sixty-six voted to give Marshal
Petain dictatorial powers. 74 By October of 1940, the first of many anti-
Jewish laws had been passed." The French were to exceed German
demands in France and even, occasionally, to pass harsher anti-Jewish
laws than their German counterparts."
A focus on surface phenomena, such as interpreting, analyzing,
and implementing the law, while ignoring its underlying antidemo-
cratic and, ultimately, murderous reality, was characteristic of the Ger-
man and French legal professions, bureaucrats and citizenry. The new
laws were sanitized as their terms became assimilated into the routine
discourse of the legal profession.
Others have noted the importance of language in this context.
Weisberg recounts the story of Marc Boegner, a Protestant pastor, who
analysis may increase the likelihood of our being beset by the evils of our century. My view is that
deconstruction allows us to heighten our understanding of the phenomena to which it is applied
and, through a heightened comprehension of reality, to increase our ability to correctly interpret
danger signals, thereby maximizing the chances of effective responses.
73 For an account of France's role at the forefront of such rights in the wake of the French
Revolution, and its influence on other European countries to follow suit, see MICHAEL R. MARaus
& ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 27 (1981).
74 The National Assembly approved the following article: "The National Assembly gives all
power to the government of the Republic under the authority and signature of Marshal Fêtain,
to promulgate by one or several acts a new Constitution of the French State. This Constitution
shall guarantee the rights of work, family and nation." MARC FERRO, PETAIN 132 (1987) (my
translation). The last words of this article "travail, famine, patrie" became the slogan of occupied
France, imprinted on its currency and ubiquitous on posters plastered throughout the country.
This trilogy of work, family and nation was a pointed replacement of the tripartite slogan of the
French Revolution: "liberte, igaliti, fraternite" ("liberty, equality, fraternity").
75 See FEAR°, supra note 74; ANDRE KAsm, LES JUIFS PENDANT L'OCCUPATION (1991), Marrus
and Paxton note a number of prior antisemitic ordinances, which swiftly followed the estab-
lishment of Vichy, but which targeted Jews without explicit reference to them. These ordinances
restricted the medical and legal professions to people with French fathers and allowed recently
naturalized citizens to be stripped of their French citizenship. See MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note
73, at 3-21.
78 For an excellent discussion of the French anti-Jewish measures as exceeding, and largely
independent of, Nazi pressure, see WEISBERG, supra note 62, at 127-87. Weisberg cites to MARRUS
& PAXTON, supra note 73, at 32, for slightly different numbers in the vote of the National Assembly
from those which 1 have given. WEISBERG, Apra note 62, at 127-87; see also HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM; A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963); FERRO, supra note 74;
KAspi, supra note 75; MARRUS & PAvroN, supra note 73.
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met with Laval, Petain's Prime Minister, to tell him about the horren-
dous suffering of the Jews who had been rounded up and taken to
Drancy, a French transit camp in which Jews were kept in horrible
conditions before transport to Auschwitz?' Apparently Laval responded
that Drancy was an agricultural center. Boegner remarked that he,
Boegner, "talked to [Laval] about murder . . . [and] he answered me
with gardening."78
Bruno Bettelheim discusses the psychology of linguistic sanitization:
Using technical or specially created terms instead of words
from our common vocabulary is one of the best-known and
most widely used distancing devices, separating the intellec-
tual from the emotional experience. Talking about 'the holo-
caust' permits us to manage it intellectually where the raw
facts, when given their ordinary names, would overwhelm us
emotionally—because it was catastrophe beyond comprehen-
sion, beyond the limits of our imagination, unless we force
ourselves against our desire to extend it to encompass these
terrible events . . . . Even the Nazis—usually given to gross-
ness in language and action—shied away from facing openly
what they were up to and called ... mass murder 'the final
solution of the Jewish problem.' . . . The Nuremberg judges
of these Nazi criminals followed their example of circumlo-
cution by coining a neologism out of one Greek and one
Latin root: genocide. These artificially created technical terms
fail to connect with our strongest feelings. 79
77 For the most thorough account of the Drancy internment camp, see GEORGES WELLERS,
UN Juts Sous VICHY (1991) (originally published in 1973 under the title L'ETOILE JAUNE A
L'HEURE DE VICHY).
78 WEIsRERG, supra note 62, at 128 (citing MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note 73, at 353).
Weisberg concludes that, through linguistic displacement, "[t]he French succeeded in avoiding
the obvious, cold realties taking place under their very eyes." Id.
79 BRUNO BErFELIIEIM, The Holocaust—One Generation Later, in SURVIVING AND OTHER
ESSAYS 84 (1979). Reflecting on evidence presented at Klaus Barbie's trial, Ted Morgan concludes
that
the use of ... flat and unspecific language was part of the conditioning to do away
with any moral reaction. To say that people were "treated" or "taken care of," or
that areas were "swept clean," made mass murder impersonal and bureaucratic. It
was a way of sidestepping all moral questions by focusing on logistics. The only
conceivable way to implement the Final Solution was to convert it into a set of
logistical problems, such as crowd control and railroad timetables.
TED MORGAN, AN UNCERTAIN HOUR: THE FRENCH, THE GERMANS, THE JEWS, THE KLAUS BARBIE
TRIAL AND THE CITY OF LYON, 1940-1945, at 130 (1990). The French intellectual, Alain Finkielk-
raut, notes that language denoting the murder °flews went out of the Nazis' vocabulary precisely
when they decided to exterminate all Jews: "[M]ass murder demanded the gas Ziklon 13 and the
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Edgar Faure, a French prosecutor at Nuremburg, commenting on
a German telegram which he offered in evidence on February 5,
1946, about the successful arrest and deportation of Jewish children
from a school in Izieu, France, noted that "[One can say that there
is something even more striking and more horrible than the con-
crete fact of the abduction of these children, and that is the bureau-
cratic tone of the report, and the conference where several officials
are tranquilly discussing it, as one of the normal procedures of their
department.""
Deconstruction cannot provide foundational values with which to
inspire either resistance to tyranny or loyalty to a tradition of justice
and fairness. Deconstruction can, however, elucidate just such under-
lying contradictions as the French ignored in the 1940s. The complex-
ity of reality becomes accessible by locating points of rupture in lan-
guage, for they are the hallmarks of a split between the signifier and
the signified. Deconstruction cannot protect us but it can open our
eyes so that, if we have the will and the courage, we can try to use our
enhanced understanding to further our values.
mystification of its victims as wen. In the gradual transformation of Polish concentration camps
into extermination camps, bombast gave way to euphemism . . . A carefully monitored use of
terms banished death from the Nazi vocabulary." FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 62, at 45.
"Quoted in Morgan, supra note 78, at '272. For more on the events at Izieu, see infra note
125 and accompanying text. See WEtsmito, supra note 62 (identifying "professional discourse" as
the vehicle for fitcilitating atrocity within civilization); see also JANah.gyrrcH & liEuLowrrz, supra
note 62, at 107 (my translation) (referring to the Nazis as "experts in the art of regrouping
contradictory theses and playing on the ambiguity which results from such recategorization.
Imposture is even inscribed in the name of the Nazis' doctrine; national-socialism."). And see
Wiesel's criticism of the case with which the principals fit into ordinary legal roles in the
Eichmann trial and the "play of legality" which falsified it. ELIE WIESEL, Notre Commune Culpa-
bilité, in LE CHANT DES MORTS, supra note 1, at 176. More generally, for the uses and abuses of
language by totalitarian regimes, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951),
and JEAN-PIERRE FAYE, LANGAGES TOTALITAIRES (1972). For an excellent analysis of holocaust
revisionists' technique of perverting language, sec Pierre Vidal-Naquet, A Paper Eichmann, in
ASSASSINS OF MEMORY: ESSAYS ON THE DENIAL OF nu: HoLocausT 42-50 (Jeffrey Mehlmiut
trans„ 1992). Vidal-Naquet ascribes to totalitarian regimes "a common fear in the face of reality,
a common masked language." Id. at 12. An ironic etymological twist noted by Vidal-Naquet is the
fact that the French term "r&isionnisme originated in the nineteenth century during the Dreyfus
affair, and referred to the movement by Dreyfus supporters to reopen his case and to expose his
conviction as a travesty of justice motivated in substantial measure by antisenthistn. Id. at 54. (It
should be noted, however, that, until its modern usage in the context of holocaust denial, the
French word generally referred to judicial review. The judicial connotation persists today along
with the neologism.). For an examination of the term "revisionism" in the English language, and
its adoption by holocaust deniers as representing in and of itself a tactic to gain legitimacy as
historians, see DEBouisit LI PSTADT, DENYING 'Dili HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAITUF ON TRLITII
AND MEMORY 20-21 (1993).
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In the preceding sections, we have seen how the dual historical
perspectives of deconstruction's development in the United States
from literary structuralism and its origin in France after the Second
World War converge in establishing deconstruction as a systematic,
highly rigorous methodology useful for interpreting and analyzing
legal texts. We have also seen that deconstruction is a modernist
phenomenon which signals the end of the Enlightenment but which,
far from being a philosophy of nihilism or despair, offers a framework
for encompassing the nonlinear view of human progression which
characterizes the Western intellectual's perspective in our time.
The next section addresses the thesis of Guyora Binder, under
which deconstruction is a form of "Holocaust Judaism" whose primary
exponent is Elie Wiesel, and which allegedly is a philosophy of nihilism
and despair because it lacks affirmative content, and operates exclu-
sively by opposition to something else. I explore the influences on
deconstruction of Levi-Strauss' structuralism and Sartre's existential-
ism, both of which Binder correctly views as having a seminal impact
on deconstruction, but conclude, contrary to Binder's interpretation,
that the nature of their influence confirms that both deconstruction
and holocaust studies are affirmative in nature and both are premised
on a belief in individual responsibility.
V. DECONSTRUCTION'S RELATION To INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND TO "HOLOCAUST JUDAISM"
Amid the accusations that deconstruction is nihilistic and defeatist
because it preaches relativism, critics have also charged that decon-
struction provides intellectual respectability to holocaust denia1. 81 In
RI See LIPSTADT, supra note 80, at 17-19; see also Austin, supra note 8, at 212 (describing
deconstruction as compatible with, and encouraging, Nazism). Derrida has also discussed holo-
caust revisionism, but attributes it to the "statist objectivity" of Nazism which
paradoxically produced a system in which its logic, the logic of objectivity, made
possible the invalidation and therefore the effacement of testimony and of respon-
sibilities, the neutralization of the singularity of the final solution; in short, it
produced the possibility of the historiographic perversion that has been able to give
rise both to the logic of revisionism (... of the Faurisson type) as well as a positivist,
comparitist or relativist objectivism (like the one now linked to the Hislorikerstreit)
according to which the existence of an analogous totalitarian model of earlier
exterminations (the Gulag) explains the final solution, even 'normalizes' it as an
act of war, a classic state response in time of war against the Jews of the world, who,
would have, in sum [according to the Germans who espouse Historikerstnit] like a
quasi-state, declared war on the Third Reich.
Derrida, supra note 4, at 1042-43. (Historikerstreit refers to a debate currently being waged in
Germany, one side maintaining that the extermination of Jews was a justified act of war.). For a
summary of Derrida's position on the controversy surrounding de Man's antisemitic journalism,
see Balkin, supra note 51, at 1134-38.
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Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie,"
Guyora Binder posits that deconstruction is responsible for the trans-
formation of Judaism into an identity defined only in the negative, by
opposition to Nazism. Binder's analysis is of particular interest because
it constitutes a normative criticism typical of traditional anti-decon-
structionist approaches, while simultaneously accurately identifying de-
construction's historical roots in, and debt to, structuralism and exis-
tentialism, and also accurately perceiving deconstruction as a post-war
response. Binder's conclusion that deconstruction is nihilistic derives
from his view of structuralism as a theory of relativism and French
existentialism as a philosophy of despair. As discussed below, I interpret
structuralism and French existentialism differently and reach a view of
deconstruction far different from Binder's even though I share Binder's
view of the significance of structuralism and French existentialism to
deconstruction.
Binder also presents a novel charge against deconstruction. Un-
like the more traditional anti-deconstructionist conclusion that decon-
struction affords respectability to holocaust denial, Binder's view is that
deconstruction encourages holocaust study, but that focusing on the
holocaust is pernicious to Judaism and to Jewish identity.
In Binder's view, Derrida and Elie Wiesel epitomize a perspective
of holocaust Judaism which Binder criticizes on dual grounds: (1) for
yielding an identity ethically impoverished because it lacks an affirma-
tive self-definition; and (2) for forging a Jewish identity qua persecuted
victims made in the image of Christianity, rather than of Judaism:
"[T]he Jew may now find a place in Christian culture as a Christ symbol
in whose death every Christian dies and is reborn."83 This, according
to Binder, "compromises Jewish identity by representing it within a
Christian framework, and . . . questions the authenticity of Jewish iden-
tity by representing it as the product of persecution rather than self-
determination."84 Binder defines deconstruction "as a form of Holo-
caust Judaism"85 and condemns it as a "culture of despair that paralyzes
moral choice in the wake of Nazi atrocities." 86 Binder sees nothing less
than the annihilation of Judaism by deconstruction and its propo-
nents. 87
82 Binder, supra note 6, at 1321.
83 Id. at 1348,
84 Id. at 1372.
85 Id. at 1373.
86 Id.
87 Hannah Arendt notes the converse of Binder's proposition, namely, that Nazis derived
self-definition from antisemitism: "Nazi propaganda was ingenious enough to transform antisemi-
tism into a principle of self-definition, and thus to eliminate it from the fluctuations of mere
opinion." ARItNDT, supra note 76, at 356.
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Binder correctly underscores the importance of viewing decon-
struction in an historical perspective; and, more particularly, of realiz-
ing that "deconstruction [is] a post war comment." 88
 He correctly
identifies Sartrian existentialism and Levi-Straussian structuralism as
formative influences on deconstruction. Binder's interpretation of these
theories fundamentally differs from my own, however, and results in
his view that they influenced the works of both Derrida and Wiesel in
a defeatist and nihilistic manner."
Binder interprets Levi-Strauss' focus on the relations of units as a
deemphasis on the universal when, on the contrary, the study of rela-
tions is the analytical method which permits the structuralist to attain
the goal of ascertaining deep, universal structures. The structuralist
search, like its Freudian counterpart, is not at the surface (or manifest)
but at the deep level: "[S] tructural analysis is confronted with a strange
paradox well known to the linguist, that is: the more obvious structural
organization is, the more difficult it becomes to reach it because of the
inaccurate conscious models lying across the path which leads to it." 9°
The structuralist enterprise is to discover universal human tenden-
cies from an analysis of the relations of parts.9 ' Thus, Levi-Strauss refers
88 Binder, supra note 6, at 1374.
89 Although my analysis of existentialism, structuralism, deconstruction and Wiesel's writings
is diametrically opposed to Binder's interpretation, I am in complete agreement with Binder that
the writings of Derrida and Wiesel are, essentially, variations on a single theme, aptly described
by Binder as "a postwar comment," Id., although, even with respect to that issue, 1 see both Derrida
and Wiese] as addressing the dilemma of the post-war world, Jewish and non-Jewish, whereas
Binder sees their writings exclusively as Jewish responses to the holocaust. Binder makes much
of the fact that Derrida, like Wiese!, is a Jewish holocaust survivor and believes that both engaged
in a failed attempt to craft a Jewish identity in response to the holocaust. In my opinion, the
holocaust and the gulag ended the spirit of the Enlightenment and gave rise to a new system of
thought of which both deconstruction and Wiesel's writings are emblematic, but that neither
deconstruction nor Wiesel's writing is limited to the plight or identity of Jews.
91) LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 281. See also CLAUDE II:VI-STRAUSS, LE CRU rr LE CUIT
19-20 (1964), in which Levi-Strauss compares the myths of various cultures to language, arguing
that those who develop and pass on the myths are unaware of their deep structure in the same
way that people apply rules of grammar in speech without being aware of their nature. Levi-
Strauss compares his task to that of a linguist seeking language-generative syntactical principles.
Id. at 15-16.
9I See MICHAEL LANE, STRucruuALism: A READER 14 (1970), for the point that
the most distinctive point of the structuralist method is the emphasis it gives to
wholes, to totalities. Traditionally, in Anglo-American social science, structure has
been used as an analytical concept to break down sets into their constituent ele-
ments, an essentially atomistic exercise. As structuralists understand and employ
the term, a new importance has been given to the logical priority of the whole over
its parts. They insist that the whole and the parts can be properly explained only
in terms of the relations that exist between the parts. The essential quality of the
structuralist method, and its fundamental tenet, lies in its attempt to study not the
elements of a whole, but the complex network of relationships that link and unite
those elements.
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to all languages as consisting of "a special code whose terms are gen-
erated by a combination of less numerous units which themselves
derive from a more general code."92 Binder concludes that Levi-Strauss'
study of cultures, and belief that consciousness derives from culture,
signify that, in Levi-Strauss' view, human nature is not universal.°
Levi-Strauss, however, states that, "notwithstanding the cultural differ-
ences between the several parts of mankind, the human mind is eve-
rywhere one and the same."94 Indeed, at the foundation of structural-
ism lies the belief in universal human characteristics: "[T] here seems
to be general, if implicit, agreement among certain structuralists, no-
tably Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Roman Jakobson in linguistics, Jean
Piaget in psychology and Francois Jacob in biology, that there is in man
an innate, genetically transmitted and determined mechanism that acts
as a structuring farce. "95
Levi-Strauss defines "the ultimate goal of anthropology [as] con-
tribution] to a better understanding of objectified thought and its
processes."9° Far from rejecting the principle of truth, Levi-Strauss
undertook a scientific search for objectively identifiable truths about
human nature, seeking an understanding of the individual through a
scientific study of social groups. Levi-Strauss' conception of the anthro-
pologist is "modelled after the engineer, who conceives and constructs
a machine by a series of rational operations . . . for obtaining that final
empirical satisfaction for which the physical sciences and the human
92 LEVI-STRAUSS, LE CRU ET LE Curr, supra note 90, at 28 (my translation). Richard Rorty
relates the search for universal models to the Enlightenment when Newtonian physics was
emulated in the social sciences, to bring the social sciences in accordance with increasingly
accessible nature. Rorty maintains that, "[elver since [the Enlightenment], liberal social thought
has centered around social reform as made possible by what human beings are like—not knowl-
edge of what Greeks or Frenchmen or Chinese are like, but of humanity as such. We are the heirs
of this objectivist tradition, which centers around the assumption that we must step outside our
community long enough to examine it in light of something which transcends it, namely, that
which it has in common with every other actual and possible human community." RORTY, supra
note 63, at 22. Rorty's description of the Enlightenment/liberal social tradition encompasses
Levi-Strauss' objectives as he defines them in LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, SUP/
note 18, at 85:
I look for common properties by examining these structures, which are all partial
expressions, though especially well suited to scientific study, of this entity called
French, English or any other society .... [C]onvergences will be extremely impor-
tant in understanding the position of a society in relation to others of the same
type, as well as the laws which govern its evolution in time.
"13inder, supra note 6, at 1368.
sa Lfn-STRAuss, supra note 63, at 19.
95 LANE, supra note 91, at 15; see also SIMON CLARKE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STRUCTURALISM
4 (1981) ("For Levi-Strauss . . . systems of meaning are constituted by an unconscious that
emerges on a biological foundation.").
LEvi-S'rsowss, LE OW ET LE Curr, supra note 90, at 21.
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sciences feel an equal necessity . . . "97 Levi-Strauss further discusses the
importance of models to describe and account for cultural phenom-
ena: "[I] t is obvious that the best model will always be that which is
true, that is, the simplest possible model which, while being derived
exclusively from the facts under consideration, also makes it possible
to account for all of them."9B Thus, Levi-Strauss was interested in gen-
eral attributes common to all human societies.
Binder cites Levi-Strauss for the proposition that "all meaning is
`internal' to culture,"" but Levi-Strauss writes that his study of anthro-
pology "frees me from doubt, since it examines those differences and
changes in mankind which have a meaning for all men, and excludes
those peculiar to a single civilization . . . Levi-Strauss specifically
contrasts his own scientific, objective search for meaning from the
philosopher's on the basis of its practical application: "The ethnologist
does not feel obliged, as does the philosopher, to take as a principle
of reflection the conditions of exercise of his own thought, or of a
science which is that of his society and time period, so as to extend his
local findings to an understanding whose universality is limited to the
hypothetical and the tentative." 101 Levi-Strauss defines his own project
as the search for a universal and objective meaning: "[S]ince we have
undertaken to study the conditions to which systems of truth become
mutually convertible, and hence can be simultaneously receivable for
numerous subjects, the totality of these conditions acquires the char-
acter of an object endowed with its own reality, independent of each
subject."'"
Thus, for Levi-Strauss, the founder of structuralist anthropology,
just as for the literary structuralists, truth exists and is accessible. The
exhaustive thoroughness of his methodology also became the hallmark
of literary structuralism and of deconstruction.
In addition to viewing structuralism as constituting an influence
of relativism on deconstruction, Binder characterizes Sartrian existen-
tialism as defeatist and nihilistic both inherently and as an influence
on deconstruction. Binder correctly describes existentialists as "in-
habit[ing] a godless cosmos which could only be given normative
meaning by an act of human will,"103 but he dismisses the role of
97 Lgvi-STRAuss, supra note 18, at 16.
95 1d. at 281.
'Binder, supra note 6, at 1368 n.287.
ImLgvi-STRAuss, Tats•rEs TROPIQUES 58 (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans.,
1977).
LEvii-STR.Auss, LE CRU ET LE Curr, supra note 90, at 18-19 (my translation).
102 1d. at 19 (my translation).
109 Binder, supra note 6, at 1364.
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human will in existentialism by stating that existentialism "portrays hu-
man beings as passive recipients of meaning, [thus} supporting [ing]
the 'anti- humanism' often attributed to structuralists and post-struc-
turalists. "104
On the contrary, Sartrian existentialism is a doctrine of optimism
precisely because it rejects historical determinacy in favor of individual
action. It is quintessentially a doctrine of individual responsibility and
a call to face one's choices by responding to them with ethical political
conduct.'"
The great appeal of Sartrian existentialism to France's post-war
generation and to millions of others was precisely that it was not a
philosophy of despair. For a generation which had to come to terms
with the horrors of the war, the Vichy regime and with collaborators
throughout French society, Sartrian existentialism represented the prom-
ise that history can be redirected on an affirmative course because
history is not predetermined but is created by the acts of free individuals.
Sartre also believed that history has no ultimate meaning, and that
its meaning is conferred upon it through subsequent interpretation,
but not that historical meaning is random. Of central importance to
Sartrian existentialism are the twin concepts of good faith ("bonne foi")
and active involvement ("engagement"). Existentialism holds that each
person knows what is right and knows which choice must be made in
accordance with one's responsibility to do right. For Sartre, the inter-
pretive role does not signify the ability to pervert history or to deny
reality, nor does it condone rationalizing one's failures to behave
responsibly. On the contrary, Sartre unequivocally states that repre-
sentation and reality are distinct, and that events must not be allowed
to be deformed by one's consciousness of them, for events are concrete
and absolute.'" Sartre insists that each individual has the responsibility
to evaluate legal prescripts and to disobey those which are unethical.
One sees in Sartre's plays as well as his philosophical writings condem-
nation of those who have not risen to life's ethical challenges, who have
not become "engages" when life handed them their choices. Sartre uses
164 /d. at 1365.
105
 See SARTRE, supra note 35, at 54 ("In no case and in no way can the past by itself produce
an act . . . . It must be acknowledged that the indispensable and fundamental condition of all
action is the freedom of the acting being.") (my translation); see also Viktor Frank!, Logotherapy
in a Nutshell, in MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 114 (3d ed. 1984) (explaining logotherapy,
existentialism-based psychotherapy: "[L]ogotherapy sees in responsibleness the very essence of
human existence.").
1 °6 See SARTRE, supra note 35, at 21 (my translation) ("[The event] must not fade behind the
consciousness of it: it is not a representation, it is a concrete, full and absolute event."). Sartre
also distinguishes between objective facts ("le fait ol#ectif), which he views as incontrovertible,
and the meaning which one ascribes to facts ("le sens"). Id. at 101.
38	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:1
the term "en situation" to refer to the choices which life inevitably deals
one. According to Sartre, one is continually "en situation." To deny this
and behave as though one had no choice is an act of bad faith. 107
Self-serving rationalizations constitute bad faith or "mauvaise foi."
Both the challenge and difficulty of life is to make use of one's
freedom, for the Sartrian view is of a humanity completely free to act,
perpetually faced with choices, on whose shoulders rests the heavy
burden of creating history ethically. For Sartre, that freedom also
implies the refusal to be defined by one's own past mistakes, and the
struggle to do better in the future; central to Sartrian thought is that
one's past need not constitute one's destiny. 108 The hope represented
by Sartre's philosophy resides in the power of individuals to create
positive historical developments by accepting the challenge to act. 109
At the same time, Sartre appreciates the complexity of historical
phenomena and portrays their interpretive possibilities. Sartre's play
Les Mains Sales provides one of the best illustrations of this complexity.
In Les Mains Sales, Hugo, a young, French intellectual Communist, is
ordered by the party to murder his mentor, Hoederer."° The protago-
nist suffers from a politically incorrect bourgeois intellectual back-
ground and longs to gain the approval of his tougher proletarian
cohorts. Only the targeted Hoederer, currently out of line with the
ascendant party dogma, is kind and welcoming to the protagonist, and,
despite his orders to kill, the protagonist grows ever closer to Hoederer
and cannot bring himself to obey his orders. One day, however, he
chances upon Hoederer kissing his (Hugo's) wife, and he shoots Hoed-
erer instantly. In the last scene of the play, Hugo is visited by party
representatives who ask him why he committed the murder. Since
Hoederer has been reinstated posthumously by the party, Hugo is told
that he will be liquidated if he killed Hoederer for political reasons,
but that the party will leave him untouched if his motives were per-
sonal. When Hugo elects to define his murder as political, the reader
is left to ponder the multiplicity of interpretive possibilities of Hugo's
acts, both of murder and of interpretation. The fecundity of interpre-
107 See, e.g., SARTRE, supra note 35. For a literary illustration of this theory, see JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE, Huts CLOS (1944).
108 See SA RTRE, supra note 35, at 104.
109 See id. at 508-642. "To act is to change the face of the world." Id. at 508 (my translation)
(emphasis omitted). See also Hazel Barnes' interpretation of Sartre's play LES MOOCHES (1943),
based on his philosophy: Wince men and women know they are free, no oppressive govern-
ment, no established system is unthreatened." HAzEL E. BARNES, SARTRE 23 (1973).
11 °JtIAN-PAUI, SARTRE, LES MAINS SALES (1948).
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tive possibilities is a testament to the difficulty of the task but implies
neither arbitrariness nor universal validity.
The profound influence of Sartre was the ethical challenge exis-
tentialism posed to the individual: to change the course of history in
an affirmative way through ethical conduct. Because Sartre views his-
tory as directed by human acts, existentialism also offers the redemp-
tive possibility of starting anew, of repudiating even one's own past by
becoming engage and acting in good faith.
Holocaust literature and studies are characterized by a Sartrian
perspective premised on the belief that the course of history can be
changed by individual acts and that the study of history can increase
social responsibility."' The holocaust underscores the abyss into which
human society can fall, but it also exemplifies the extraordinary depth
of humanity displayed by those who risked their lives as rescuers."'
The last paragraph of Hannah Arendt's massive study of the de-
generation of societies into terror-driven totalitarianism reveals a Sar-
trian belief in the power of individuals to change the course of history
through ethical conduct:
III See, e.g., SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. °LINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: RESCUERS
OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE 260 (1988).
They [i.e., rescuers ] also highlight the important truth that interpretations of events
are human inventions, and that what and how we choose to see shape our re-
sponses—and thus the future. As W.I. Thomas and D.S. Thomas proposed sixty
years ago, "Situations defined as real are real in their consequences." If we persist
in defining ourselves as doomed, human nature as beyond redemption, and social
institutions as beyond reform, then we shalt create a future that will inexorably
proceed in confirming this view.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting in part WILLIAM ISAAC THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS,
THE CHILD IN AMERICA 572 (1928)); see also id. at xviii ("If we are to live in a world free from
the threat of Holocausts, we need to create it.").
112 See JANE MARKS, THE HIDDEN CHILDREN: THE SECRET SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST X
(1993) ("It is ironic that the nightmare and horrors of the Holocaust also became a defining
moment for courage and decency."); see also LUCIE AUBRAC, OUTWITTING THE GESTAPO (1993)
(an account of the French resistance movement); LuctEN LAZARE, LE LIVRE DES JusTEs: HISTOIRE
DU SAUVETAGE DES jUIFS PAR DES NON jUIES EN FRANCE, 1940-1944 (1993) (an account of French
rescuers ofJews); Las ARMES DE L'ESPRIT (documentary film by Pierre Sauvage on Chambon-sur-
Lignon, a study of a French Huguenot village which saved thousands of Jews); VIKTOR FRANKL,
EIN PSYCHOLOG ERLEBT DAS KONZENTRATIONS-LAGER 68-69 (1947) (my translation). Frankl, a
physician, wrote of his own decision to ascribe meaning to his death by volunteering in Dachau
to care for patients who were ill with typhus and sure to infect him. He knew that he would die
in any case, his alternative being death by exhaustion in a work commando: "If death was
inevitable, then my death should have a sense, It seemed clearly more meaningful [to die] as a
doctor able to help my comrades somewhat." FRANKI„ supra, at 68-69. One thinks also of Bruno
Bettelheim, whose studies of the disintegration of personality in concentration camp victims led
to his groundbreaking work with autistic children, using a system devised to "reverse" the
disintegration process which he had observed and studied in Nazi concentration camps. See
generally BRUNO BETTELHETM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, SUP111 note 79.
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But there remains also the truth that every end in history
necessarily contains a new beginning: this beginning is the
promise, the only 'message' which the end can ever produce.
Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the su-
preme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man's
freedom. Initium ut esset homo creatus est—`that a beginning
be made man was created' said Augustine. This beginning is
guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man." 3
In support of his argument that there is no reason to study the
holocaust, and that its study is pernicious, Binder attacks the view
espoused by many holocaust scholars that the holocaust was unique.
While there can be no definitive resolution to the question of whether
the holocaust was unique in history, my inclination is to agree with
Binder that, in its most material aspects, the holocaust was not unique.
The sources which I have found most persuasive are those also cited
by Binder: Hanna Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, 14 and Arno
Meyer's Why Did The Heavens Not Darken: The "Final Solution" in
History. 115 Arendt analyzes the holocaust as a preliminary stage in
totalitarianism rather than as a culmination of the history of antisemi-
tism. Arendt considers the regimes of Hitler and Stalin fundamentally
analogous during their respective totalitarian periods, totalitarianism
being defined as government by terror whose logical and necessary
consequence is arbitrariness in the imposition of death among its
population. Arendt characterizes Stalinist Russia as having reached a
more evolved stage of totalitarianism than Germany, and demonstrates
that the Nazi regime ended before it could attain arbitrariness in its
mechanism of terror, although it was striving for arbitrariness by the
progressive vagueness and breadth in its definition of targets for anni-
hilation: i.e., from well-defined, marginal groups, relatively easy to
ostracize, such as Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals and political dissidents,
113 ARENar, supra note 76, at 478-79; see also ANTON GILL, THE JOURNEY BACK FROM HELL:
AN ORAL HISTORY 3 (1988); PRIMO LEVI, SURVIVAL IN AUSCHWITZ AND THE REAWAKENING: Two
MEMOIRS 394 (Stuart Woolf trans., Summit Books 1986). This is less true of Arno Mayer's
exhaustive study of the Nazi Judeocide, WHY DID THE HEAVENS NOT DARKEN: THE "FINAL
SOLUTION" IN HISTORY (1988), which underscores the importance of historical influences on
perceptions of, and reactions to, contemporaneous issues.
The Sartrian view of the individual's power to shape history stands in starkest contrast to
"the well-known ideology of the Nazi state [according to which] the individual as such was either
non-existent or of no importance." BauNo BETrELHEIM, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme
Situations, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 49 (1980).
114 ARENDT, supra note 80.
115 MAYER, Supra note 113.
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Nazism had progressed to targeting the mentally ill, the retarded and
those afflicted with heart and lung ailments. According to Arendt, the
only two governments in history to have made the transition from
dictatorship to totalitarianism were Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany,
although her theory would appear also to encompass Pol Pot's regime
in Cambodia (which her book, written in 1951, predated). The French
historian Vidal-Naquet implicitly concurs with this view, contrasting
"the crimes of France in Algeria, of the United States in Vietnam [to]
actual genocides, those of the Armenians, the Jews, the Gypsies, the
Khmers [and] the Tutsis of Rwanda." 16 In addition to Arendt's analysis
of Hitler's killing machine as fundamentally analogous to Stalin's,
Arendt gives a detailed account, in Eichmann in Jerusalem,'" of the
differences with which Nazi policy was implemented against the Jews
in the various conquered European countries, demonstrating the criti-
cal role of internal responses by local administrations and populations
and concluding that it is misleading to characterize Nazi policy as
uniform. Arno Mayer concurs with Arendt in his exhaustive study of
what he calls the Nazi Judeocide. 118
The salient characteristic of holocaust scholars and authors, how-
ever, including those, like Wiesel, who believe that the holocaust was
unique, is a premise of non-unicity as their point of departure: the
underlying conviction that, since the holocaust happened once, it can
happen again, and the concomitant determination to help to prevent
its recurrence."9 Thus, the pervasive agreement among holocaust schol-
neNidal-Naquet, supra note 80, at 57.
117 ARENDT, supra note 76.
118 See MAYER, supra note 115. For the contrary argument in support of unicity, see, e.g.,
VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH, , L'IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: PARDONNER? DANS L'HONNEUR ET LA DI GNITE
(Jean-Pierre Barrou ed., Editions du Scull 1986); PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED
(Raymond Rosenthal trans., Summit Books 1988); LEVI, supra note 113. jankelevitch not only
concludes that the holocaust was unique, but also that antisemitism cannot be defined as an
instance of racism. According to jankelevitch, drawing on Freud's work in MOSES AND MONOTHE-
stsm (1939), racism is directed against the other, but antisemitism is directed against the almost-
the-same, and the more similar the not-quite-the-same are, the more enraged and unappeasable
the fury they engender: "[1]t is minimal otherliness which engenders the most inexpiable hatreds,
feeds the most tenacious rancors . . . the similar-different person belongs to the controversable
realm of ambiguity." JANxErivrrcm & BERLOWITZ, supra note 62, at 1369 (my translation).
119 Hence the widespread slogan "never again." See generally GILL, supra note 113; SAMUEL
PISAR, LE SANG DE L'EsPout (1979); Wiese!, supra note 1; LEVI, supra note 113. Bruno Bettelheim
also expresses the motive of coming to a better understanding of human nature, an objective
distinct from, but not inconsistent with, that of hoping to prevent a repetition of the holocaust:
The incentive for writing [about the holocaust] ... can be external or internal; probably most
often it is a combination of the two." BRUNO BETTELHEIM, Trauma and Reintegration, in SURVIV-
ING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 19. A survivor of the Dachau and Buchenwald camps,
Bruno Bettelheim retrospectively attributed his own holocaust scholarship to an "unconscious ...
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ars is that the holocaust, whether or not unique up to the time of its
occurrence, is not unique prospectively.
Compelling evidence that holocaust scholarship and literature are
acts of hope whose objective is to prevent a recurrence of the holocaust
undermines Binder's theory that holocaust scrutiny is an act of de-
spair. 12° Of particular interest in the present study is Binder's argument
that the holocaust should be ignored because its ultimate effect will be
to make Jews lose an affirmative sense of identity, for this argument is
highly analogous to the proposal that deconstruction should be ig-
nored because it will lead to undermining faith in the United States'
jurisprudential system. Both positions are normative; neither addresses
issues of substantive merit or of truth. 12 ' One would ask Binder what
the value of Judaism can be if it cannot incorporate the occurrence of
the holocaust, and if its perpetuation were to require that its adherents
disregard an event of such cataclysmic magnitude.' 22
attempt to master this shattering experience not just intellectually but also emotionally" and an
effort to integrate the experience, to reverse the personality-disintegrating effects of the experi-
ence itself. BRUNO BErrELHEIM, The Ultimate Limit, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note
79, at 16-17.
120I do not claim that holocaust scholarship and literature represent solely an affirmative
political act on the part of authors to prevent a recurrence of the holocaust. I believe that they
represent an affirmative political act in part, and that holocaust studies are a necessary aspect of
any serious study of the modern period, capable of shedding light on, and necessary to an
understanding of, both human nature and polity.
121
 Binder begins his Commentary with the question "[m]ay we recover knowledge from the
ashes of Auschwitz, and walk away enriched?" Binder, supra note 6, at 1321-22. The answer
provided in the following sentence is phrased normatively, revealing that, even if the correct
answer is yes, he will urge otherwise: "we must not allow ourselves to be edified by atrocity." Id. at
1322 (emphasis added). Thus, Binder rejects edification on ideological grounds. See id.; see also
FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 62, at 54, criticizing the utilitarian focus:
The partisans of Jewish memory declare: The dead teach the living . . . . The
enemies of Jewish memory declare: These dead serve no purpose, weigh us down,
enfeeble our vision, mystify what's at stake today. Both sides can conceive of the
dead only in terms of their usefulness.
. . . If the future is for all things the measure of value, memory has no ground:
for he who looks to gather the materials of memory places himself at the service
of the dead, and not the other way around. He knows that they have only him in
the world, and that if he turns his back to the manner in which they lived and died,
then these dead Jews who were at his mercy will truly perish, and modernity, in love
with itself, absorbed by daily intrigues, will not even notice they have disappeared.
122 Ironically, Binder's claim that only a Judaism which discounts the holocaust can be
authentic, BINDER, supra note 6, at 1344-1355, finds an echo in Wiesel's nostalgic presentation
of pre-war Judaism; Wiesel, however, understands that denying reality does not change it. The
many crazed characters who appear in Wiesel's fictional works attest to the urgent desire to undo
their past, but beneath their distorted layers of phantasmagoria always lurks the inalterable truth
of their terrible pasts. In an autobiographical account, Wiesel recounts his own return to Sighet,
the village in Hungary from which he and his family were deported in 1944 to Auschwitz. In the
town of his childhood, eerily familiar, yet empty of the Jewish life which had thrived there for
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As an example of a Jew with an authentic identity, rather than an
allegedly impoverished deconstructionist-Wieselian form of identity,
Binder evokes Leah Feldblum, a Jewish teacher at a school for Jewish
children in lzieu, France. Feldblum carried forged identity papers and
would have been able to escape unharmed, if she had not given herself
up when the Gestapo arrested the children of Izieu. She accompanied
the children to Auschwitz where Nazis murdered all of them except
herself.' 23 Binder views her disclosure of her true identity as proof of
the authenticity of her identity: "She did not adopt this identity out of
defiance, nor, when it proved costly to her survival, did she give it up.
Leah Feldblum needed no holocaust to know who she was. "124
Binder offers no substantiation for his interpretation of her be-
havior or, indeed, any evidence that Feldblum did not engage in the
same conduct as Wiesel after her return from Auschwitz: i.e., trying to
keep alive the memory of the holocaust and its victims, behavior which
Binder defines as exemplifying inauthenticity of identity. Indeed, Binder's
sole cited source concerning Feldblum is her testimony at Klaus Bar-
bie's trial. Her presence as a witness militates towards the conclusion
that, like Wiesel, Feldblum is dedicated to bearing witness in the
memory of those who otherwise would be forgotten.I 25 Binder's inter-
centuries, he is shocked to see an old, bearded man in Hasidic attire. He is overcome with joy:
"Finally a Jew from before: a Jew whom the cataclysm hadn't touched." ELIE WIESEI., Le Dernier
Retour, in LE CHANT Drs Moirrs, supra note 1, at 17i (my translation). But of course, there was
no such Jew. Bearded and dressed as the Jews of his town had been in Wiesel's childhood, the
old man who evoked for Wiesel a world which was lost had also been touched by the cataclysm,
and the old man is stunned into a long silence when Wiesel addresses him in Yiddish, proof
enough of the mutuality of their loss. See id. at 171.
"3 See Binder, supra note 6, at 1354; see also KASPI, supra note 75, at 248,347.
124 Binder, supra note 6, at 1354-55.
I 25 The impulse to bear witness is an affirmative political act in more ways than one. It is not
only an attempt to keep society vigilant to the dangers of a renewed holocaust, but also the only
possibility of salvaging from titter meaninglessness the deaths of millions of innocents. See, e.g.,
JANidt..tvricti, supra note 118, at 17-46; WIESEL, PlaidOyer POUT leS Marts, in LE CHANT DES
MORTS, supra note 1, at 191-220. Those who survived assumed the dual burden of honoring the
dead in their own lives on the one hand and, on the other, of living affirmative, positive lives. To
allow themselves to be consumed by despair would he yet another triumph for Hitler; to live a
life of lighthearted forgetfulness would be a betrayal of those who died without anyone else to
mourn them. See BETTELHEIM, Trauma and Reintegration, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS,
Supra note 79, at 26, on the tormenting question of the problem of survivorship and the answer
given to a Jewish survivor who asked a Christian rescuer why she was among the few who survived:
"'So that you prove for the rest of your life that it was worth you being saved."' See also CLAUDINE
VE1G11, I DIDN'T SAY GOODBYE 20 (Ros Schwartz trans., 1979) ("Having escaped persecution by
the Nazis, I have always had the impression that life has been 'granted' to me a second time. And
so I had to show that I deserved that life, that 1 was worthy to live it. It was no longer even mine;
I was living, in a way, by proxy."). Similarly, Helen Epstein, a child of survivors horn after the war,
writes: "I felt an obligation to my family who perished and to my parents who survived .... I felt
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pretation is particularly questionable in that Feldblum's act of surren-
dering herself to the Gestapo may be seen as suicidal, the ultimate act
of despair rather than of self-affirmation, based on a conclusion that
to continue living in a world so debased by evil was less desirable than
death.
Wiesel has suggested this interpretation for Ernie Levy's voluntary
deportation to Auschwitz in his fiancée's transport in Andre Schwarz-
Bart's le Dernier des justes.' 26
 Schwarz-Bart's book is a fictionalized his-
tory of a Jewish family through centuries, intertwined with the talmudic
legend that God spared humanity because of the existence of thirty-six
just men on earth. In Schwarz-Bart's account, each generation of the
Levy family includes a just son, endowed with characteristics of often
seemingly dubious worth which, as the book progresses, crystallize into
a purity of heart which the reader comes to recognize as the sign of
the just. Born in Germany, Ernie emigrates to France with his family.
His parents and siblings are deported when the Germans occupy France,
but he manages to escape and becomes adept at hiding from the
Gestapo. When his fiancee is caught, however, he joins her voluntarily
at Drancy and we last see Ernie, caring, with his fiancée, for small
children who happen to be on the same transport to Auschwitz. Ernie
fulfills the book's title as the last of the just because he will die childless.
Wiesel offers the insight that Ernie does not go to his death for love
of his fiancée, as it might appear, but because death is preferable to
life in the world as it had become. 127
Wiesel also suggests the more general thesis that, in a totalitarian
world, survival itself necessarily becomes tainted, because it requires
the survivor's ethical degradation. 128 Bettelheim concurs, explaining
the survivor's inner dilemma as follows: "'[T]he reason you had the
chance to survive was that some other prisoner died in your stead . .
Some of them died because you pushed them out of an easier place
of work; others because you did not give them some help, such as food,
that you might possibly have been able to do without.' And the ultimate
accusation to which there is no acceptable answer: You rejoiced that
it was some other who had died rather than you.'"' 29
that my life wasn't entirely my own, and I wanted to make the most out of it that I could." HELEN
EPSTEIN, CHILDREN OF THE HOLOCAUST 302 (1979).
126 ANDRE SCHWARZ-BART, LE DERNIER DES JUSTES (1959).
I27
	 ELIE WIESEL, Notre Commune Cutpabilite, in LE CHANT DES MORTS, supra note 1, at
187.
I" Id.
129 BRUNO BETTELHEIM, Trauma and Reintegration, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra
note 79, at 27; see also ERANKL, supra note 112, at 8-9, describing the fights among prisoners
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In his admonition against viewing Jews as holocaust victims, Binder
fails to grapple with the fact that they were victims, and assumes both
that Jews controlled their own destinies and that it is now their fault
for presenting an image which has strong resonances in Christian
tradition. Binder does not reckon with the fact that the holocaust did
not happen because Jews desired it, that the Jewish dead were victims,
not in order to gain acceptance into Christian society through a Christ-
reminiscent martyrdom, but because they were rounded up, deported
and annihilated by the Gestapo, the Einsatzgruppen or the milice, more
fundamentally, Binder does not recognize that the holocaust was an
event of a magnitude to make most survivors unable to proceed with-
out reference to it."°
when some were to be selected for transport from a smaller camp to one furnished with gas
chambers and crematories. Frank] concludes that:
[t]he outsider, who was never himself in a concentration camp, the uninitiated,
creates a completely incorrect picture of the conditions in the camp ... inasmuch
as he is unable to come near to understanding the tough two-sided struggle for
existence . . . . Everyone was aware that, for each single person who was rescued
another life had to be extinguished, in lieu of the one who was saved.
FRANKL, supra note 112, at 8-9 (my translation); see also id. at 10 (my translation):
Of the camp prisoners who remained in the camp for many, many years, from one
camp to the other and who finally ended up in dozens of camps in all, on the
average only those could manage to stay alive who in this struggle for survival were
without scruples, who did not shrink even from violence or theft; nor, more gener-
ally, from dishonest methods used in the embittered struggle for survival; they did
not even shrink from stealing from comrades. All of us who, through thousands
upon thousands of lucky coincidences or miracles of God—however one wishes to
call them—managed to come through alive, we know and can say without hesita-
tion: the best did not return.
See also WIESEL, Notre Commune Culpabiliti, in LE CHANT DES MORTS, supra note 1, at 186-87,
for an almost identical view of the camp survivor. See generally Arendt, supra note 80, for the
manner in which totalitarian regimes incapacitate their populations by coopting them into
working for their own destruction. See also DAVID ROUSSET, THE OTHER KINGDOM (1947), for
the totalitarian state's requiring its population to cooperate voluntarily in its own destruction in
the name of the law, for the alleged good of the state.
tsoe psychologists and holocaust survivors Bruno Bettelheim and Victor Frankl have
shown that survivors endured a trauma with lifelong effects. Bettelheim in particular studied the
complete disintegration of the personality in the concentration camps, a process of dehumani-
zation which eradicated every aspect of the personality normally associated with humankind, See
Bruno Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 381 ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 417-52 (1943). Recent studies have resulted in similar findings among survivors of Pol
Pot's terror. See, e.g., Alec Wilkinson, A Changed Vision of God, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 24,1994,
at 52. Frank! also describes the disintegration process, noting the psychological importance of
clinging to the last remnants of human dignity through symbolic acts and discussing the psycho-
logical consequences of losing the will to continue such symbolic acts. FRANKL, supra note 112,
at 29. Frankl, however, disagrees with Bettelheim's ultimate conclusion, maintaining that inner
freedom can be an enduring trait, capable of withstanding any onslaught. See id. at 98-118.
Frankl's work also makes clear, however, that the trauma had lifelong consequences. For a
discussion of the continuing effects of the trauma in the lives of holocaust survivors' offspring,
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Binder's advocacy of ignoring the holocaust and rejecting a col-
lective memory of persecution, far from leading to authenticity of
identity, as he purports, would constitute repression of identity for
survivors and, for historians of the modern age, a denial of reality."
Binder's thesis depends on the ability to choose one's identity. The
truth, however unpleasant it may be, is that Jews could not choose their
identity during the Nazi reign of terror and that most had no means
of escaping victimization. Victimization was imposed on them, not
chosen, and those who survived, as the term "holocaust" implies, al-
though not incinerated at its epicenter, bear its ineradicable and pro-
found scars."2
Despite accurately perceiving the force of existentialist influences
in Wiesel's and Derrida's writing, Binder interprets the significance of
Auschwitz as the death of God and the harbinger of a deconstruction-
see AARON HASS, IN THE SHADOW OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE SECOND GENERATION (1990). Bettel
heim has also written extensively about the widespread resistance to facing the proposition that
extreme conditions can reduce life to a state in which no human dignity remains. He has ascribed
the great popularity of Anne Frank and Helen Keller to the desire to believe that a core of human
dignity can persist in the midst of any hardship. See BRUNO BETTELHEIM, The Ignored Lesson of
Anne Frank, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 246-57.
" I Binder is right that holocaust survivors have lived in response to Nazism, trying to balance
the burden of life-affirming conduct with the wish to honor the dead, and trying to defeat Hitler's
agenda by engaging in conduct which they perceive likely to defeat his objectives. Such behavior
incorporates reality rather than denies it, however, and evidences an authenticity of identity. See
MORGAN, supra note 79, at 26 (much of which is based on circa 10,000 pages of depositions and
documents compiled over four years by the juge d'instruction who indicted Barbie), quoting Klaus
Barbie's words after his conviction, urging the burial of the holocaust ("'I never had the power
to decide about deportations. I fought the resistance, which I respect, sometimes harshly. It was
wartime, and today the war is over ....'"), and the author's reaction ("But the war is never over,
not for the victims and their families, and not for a nation's collective memory . . . ."). Morgan
offers yet another reason why the holocaust cannot be relegated to a forgotten past:
After the war Michel Goldberg learned that his father had died at Auschwitz.
[Goldberg's father was caught by Klaus Barbie in Lyon; Goldberg went to Bolivia
when Barbie's whereabouts were discovered there in the 1960's by Nazi hunter
Beate Klarsfeld, intending to murder Barbie and avenge his father's death; he found
Barbie, but in the end could nut bring himself to pull the trigger.] In his dreams
he began to see six blue-black digits on his forearm getting bigger because he was
growing. Later, when he had a family of his own, his daughter asked, "Why don't
we visit your father's grave?" He had to tell her that there was no grave. His father
was a small pile of ashes mixed in with others. Because of his daughter's question,
he understood that when there was no grave, there was no mourning, and when
there was no mourning, you never stopped mourning.
Id. at 213-14.
I 3-2 Many survivors dislike the term "holocaust." See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 113, at vii
(eschewing the term in preference to "Judeocide"). Elie Wiesel rejects the term on religious
grounds and Bruno Bettelheim criticizes it as a linguistic cleansing to render the concept
emotionally palatable, BRUNO BE-rrw-tElm, The Holocaust—One Generation Later, in SURVIVING
AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 84. I find the signifier well-suited to the signified because
of the imagery of fire, suggesting various degrees of burning, depending on one's proximity to
the conflagration,
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ist-holocaust philosophy of despair. Binder quotes passages from Wie-
sel's writing to the effect that God, and Wiesel's faith in God, died in
Auschwitz.'" Binder characterizes this sentence as "the most memora-
ble passage in Wiesel's writing . . .
Wiesel's discovery, however, which indeed elucidates his connec-
tion with deconstruction, was not the death of God, but the death of
man, and not just of man, but of man's concept of man: "In Auschwitz
died not only man, but also the idea of man ... in Auschwitz the world
was burning its own heart."'" And "it is there that the future of man
was killed."'"
Thus, it was not God who died in Auschwitz. It is of paramount
importance to an assessment of the Derrida-Wiesel Weltanschauung to
realize that, for both Derrida and Wiesel, the totalitarian systems and
their unfathomable horrors signify the end of humankind as conceived
in the Enlightenment tradition, but not of God, for God had receded
as the locus of progress in the Western intellectual tradition with the
rise of theism in the eighteenth century, long before Auschwitz, the
gulag or the Cambodian killing fields.
God persisted as the focus of human hope through the seven-
teenth century. In French intellectual thought, Pascal's wager repre-
sents the continued ascendancy of God as a controlling influence.'"
The following century saw the rise of theism and the transfer from
God to humans of hope for the future. The Bible of the theist was
accumulated knowledge, and civilization was to be perfected in tandem
with increased knowledge and scientific discovery. Diderot undertook
the twenty-year project of the Encyclopedie. Montesquieu engaged in a
study of the laws and social organizations of other cultures, or, as he
called it of "the spirit of laws" to formulate a larger vision based on
natural law.'" Faith in reason is nowhere more visible than in Montes-
I" For example: "Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever." Binder,
supra note 6, at 1350 (quoting ELIE WIESEL, NICHT 4 (1969)),
1341d.
135 WIEsEL, P/aidoyer Pour les Mores, in LE CHANT DES MORTS, supra note 1, at 210 (my
translation).
136 ELIE W1ESEL, Moshe-le-fou, in LE CHANT DES MORTS, supra note 1, at 108 (my translation).
1 " Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a brilliant mathematician, was also a fervent Jansenist who
hoped to convert libertine nonbelievers by appealing to their gambling spirit and inviting them
to wager for the existence of God and so attain the possibility of eternal salvation if their wager
proved correct. Pascal's wager is characterized by its adoption of reason and self-interest as the
bases for persuading libertines to reject reason and science in favor of religious faith. See BLAISE
PASCAL, OEUVRES ComrtkrEs 550-52 (1963). While Pascal rejected science in favor of religion,
Spinoza's TRACTATUS TIEOLOGICO-POLMCUS (1670) already heralded the approaching age of
reason by subordinating religion to the Cartesian method of analysis. (It is interesting to note
that Pascal's PENsPEs and Spinoza's TRACTATUS were originally published in the same year.).
138 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, DE L 1 ESPRIT DES LOIS (1748).
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quieu: "[T] o the scientific ideal he added a philosophical ideal, a faith
in the power of reason to triumph over the legally unreasonable."'"
This faith in the power of reason and knowledge to perfect society
is the hallmark of the Enlightenment system of thought, expressed
throughout the Western world by Diderot, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Con-
dillac, Fontenelle, Fenelon, Beccaria, Locke, Jefferson, Franklin and
Madison. The spirit of the Enlightenment is a seminal part of the
United States' government and legal system.m
The twentieth century signalled the end of the Enlightenment
belief in progress towards a perfectible, rational civilization. 14' Before
the occurrence of the extermination camp and the gulag, Freud an-
nounced that human behavior is subject to the irrational force of the
unconscious. Although deconstruction owes much to both Sartrian
existentialism and Freud, it is interesting to note that Sartre rejected
Freud's theory of the unconscious. Contrary to Binder's view of Sartre
as a proponent of ethical paralysis, Sartre's view of individual respon-
sibility did not allow for lapses in ethical choices which might be
ascribed to the unconscious by a Freudian. Sartre rejected the uncon-
scious as "bad faith," or an attempt to evade one's social responsibility:
"Bad faith implies by its essence the unity of one consciousness . . . .
One does not undergo one's bad faith, one isn't infected by it, it isn't
a state. But consciousness affects itself on its own with bad faith; this
project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-
reflexive grasp of consciousness as consisting in bad faith. "142
Sartre criticized Freud directly inasmuch as "psychoanalysis substi-
tutes for the notion of bad faith the idea of a lie without a liar, it allows
1 " FELLOWS & TORREY, supra note 66, at 145.
14° See, e.g., ROBERT ROSWELL PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, A POLITI-
CAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE (1760-1791) (1959); ROBERT ROSWELL
PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND
AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE (1789-1800) (1964); see also RICHARD I BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJEC-
TIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) (ascribing the epithet
"Cartesian anxiety" to this phenomenon) (cited in Winter, supra note 61); BRUNO BETTELHEIM,
The Ultimate Limit, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 8 (espousing the theory
that the "belief in the unlimited blessings of progress" is "(Ole modern defense against death
anxiety"). Richard Rorty points out that the Enlightenment search for truth originated in the
Greek ideal of pursuing truth for its own sake, rather than for personal or communal good. See
RORTY, supra note 63, at 21. The Enlightenment view may best be described as expecting personal
and community good to be derived as a byproduct of the search for truth and knowledge. For
the thesis that, in the eighteenth century, happiness was not considered worthy to be an avowable
goal but was believed to be an assured derivative of virtue, hence the pursuit of virtue for the
sake of its by-product, happiness, see ROBERT MAUZI, L'IDEE DU BONHEUR DANS LA LITTERATURE
ET LA PENStE FRANCAISES AU XVIIIE SI4CLE . 0960).
191 see, e.g., JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM (1993).
192
 SARTRE, supra note 35, at 87 (my translation).
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for how I can, not lie to myself, but be lied to, since it places me with
respect to myself in the situation of another with respect to myself." 145
Sartrian bad faith is conscious; the Freudian unconscious has presence
at the level of consciousness also, however, in the sense that its trans-
mutations at the manifest level are the keys which unlock the doors to
the unconscious. This idea of presence in absence through manifesta-
tions which, when appropriately analyzed, are the indicia of underlying
meaning is pervasive in structuralist and deconstructionist analysis.
The hostile reception accorded to Freud's theories of the uncon-
scious, like current opposition to deconstruction, no doubt emanated
to some extent from resistance to the unwelcome prospects for human
society which both theories imply. It is my belief that anti-deconstruc-
tionists use the defense of denial as a way to avoid facing facts which
they cannot controvert and which they find intolerable.'" The accusa-
tion by anti-deconstructionists that deconstruction is defeatist, and,
more particularly, that studying the holocaust is defeatist, is a reaction
to the incontrovertibly unpleasant truths which such studies illumi-
nate. Denial, however, paralyzes its practitioners from taking effective
action. One would ask of anti-deconstructionists what confidence can
be placed in a jurisprudential system if its constituent elements cannot
withstand the probing scrutiny of deconstructionist analysis or, for that
matter, of any logically sound analytical methodology. The deconstruc-
tionist and the holocaust scholar, far from being defeatist, illuminate
reality. It is for the enlightened to make positive use of what has been
illuminated. 145 Our chances of improving the world diminish to the
extent that we do not face reality.
145 Id. (my translation).
144 See BETTELHEIM, The Holocaust—One Generation Later, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS,
supra note 79, at 90, for a definition of denial. Bettelheim explains that, "[w]hen anxiety becomes
overwhelming, even normal adults tend to regress to use it. That is why Jews under Nazi
domination, in the face of obvious facts but in mortal anxiety, engaged in denial so massive that
under other circumstances it would have been considered delusional." Id. It should be noted that
deconstruction has been accused of denial also—its intense focus on antilogy being equated with
denial of objective reality. See LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 89-99 (comparing Derrida and decon-
struction to the world described in George Orwell's 1984 (1949)). Lehman's parodic comparison
of deconstructionist jargon with Orwellian doublespeak, however, ultimately implicates inept
followers of Derrida rather than deconstruction itself.
145 Gary Minda captures the deconstructionist approach:
Postmoderns would resist the idea of a postmodern theory of jurisprudence. They
would instead emphasize the incredible degree of freedom that exists in the midst
of diversity. They would say that the future of jurisprudence remains in our hands,
that it is up to us to build the legal world we wish to inhabit.
Minda, supra note 60, at 59.
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In his focus on the Jewish aspect of holocaust studies as exem-
plary of deconstructionist practice, Binder misses a seminal element:
holocaust studies do not concern Jews exclusively, and the mission
of holocaust studies is not restricted to the perceived good of Jews
alone. 146 As scholars such as Arendt and Bettelheim have demonstrated,
the holocaust was not so much the most recent manifestation of an-
tisemitism as the first stage of modern totalitarianism. 147
Deconstruction and holocaust studies are connected as responses
to the modern age which saw the birth of the totalitarian state. En-
demic to the deconstructionist approach is a refusal of absolutism. Its
anti-absolutist attribute was its attraction for the structuralist literary
theorists who were the first to introduce deconstruction into American
academic consciousness. Deconstruction's critics point to the dangers
of relativism. Deconstructionists and their intellectual forebears, how-
ever, bring to their Weltanschauung an all-too-vivid sense of what was
wrought by the absolutism preached by this century's totalitarian re-
gimes. The relativism implicit in deconstruction does not constitute a
denial of the existence of truth, but a caution against unwarranted
conclusions of exclusive propriety over the truth.'"
146 See, e.g., OLINER & OLINER, supra note 111, at xviii.
The world is filled with groups marked for special cruelty. The Holocaust ushered
in a new death technology, as awesome in its implications as nuclear technology.
Whereas nuclear warfare threatens to burn all of us into ashes, Holocaust technol-
ogy created a means whereby selected populations could be plucked out from
among their neighbors and destroyed. The Holocaust points not only to the fragility
of Jews but to the precariousness of any group that might have the misfortune of
being so arbitrarily designated. If we are to live in a world free from the threat of
Holocausts, we need to create it.
Id.; see also LIPSTADT, supra note 80, at 20 ("[T]he Holocaust was not a tragedy of the Jews but
a tragedy of civilization in which the victims were Jews .. . ."). Of related interest are the results
of Aaron Hass' study of the psychological effects of the holocaust on survivors' children. Hass
discovered significantly less ethnocentrism among holocaust survivor children who were knowl-
edgeable about the holocaust than in their American non-survivor-related counterparts. HAss,
supra note 130, at 167 (citing Morton Weinfeld & John J. Sigal, The Effect of the Holocaust on
Selected Socio-Political Attitudes of Adult Children of Survivors, 22 GAN. REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY
365-82 (1986)); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 125, at 301 (A child of concentration camp survivors,
explaining her differences with Israelis who urged her to immigrate on the ground that her
parents' experience should have taught her that Israel was the only solution: "My parents'
experience had taught me nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it had taught me to distrust
ideologies and final solutions of any kind.").
147 Aungurr, supra note 80; BRUNO BETTELHErra, Eichmann: The System, The Victims, in
SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 265.
148 Indeed, as Winter so aptly puts it, "[lit is ... the insistence on . 	 the absolute that is
both nihilist and profoundly antihumanist." Winter, supra note 61.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to clarify our understanding of decon-
struction by examining its historical context. Part I traced deconstruc-
tion's pre-structuralist and structuralist antecedents in the French lit-
erature departments of American universities which were to provide
legal scholars with their introduction to deconstruction. Pre-structural-
ist criticism, characterized by ruminations on authorial intent and a
lack of analytical rigor, was rejected in favor of structuralism's systema-
tized scrutiny of texts. Structuralism, however, was flawed by unjustified
claims of scientific accuracy and absolutist pretentions of yielding a
single, correct interpretation, flaws which led structuralist critics to
turn to deconstruction.
Part II explored deconstructionist methodology, arguing that de-
construction does not reject the idea of truth or meaning and that its
focus on antinomy makes it appropriate for analysis in fields like law
and literature which elude scientific precision and verification. Part 11
also refuted criticism that deconstruction is random in application and
validates all meaning indiscriminately.
Part III explored deconstruction's implications in the legal field;
namely, that contradictions embedded in the tenets of our legal system
point to the fragility of our jurisprudential system and of the rule of
law, and that it is not our jurisprudential system which has spared the
United States the horrors which have befallen others this century, or
which can be relied on to ensure our future safety. One can see in the
collapse of the French constitutional system from 1940 to 1944, and in
the antisemitic legislation of the Vichy regime, the inability of systems
similar to our own to create internal safeguards for their own perpetu-
ation. The Vichy legislation also provides insight into the usefulness of
deconstruction as an analytical tool to elucidate the sort of contradic-
tions which the French were able to ignore, as they failed to differen-
tiate traditional legal measures from the antisemitic laws and decrees,
focusing instead on illusory surface similarities of terminology and
structure.
In Part IV, we saw that the more traditional criticism that decon-
struction provides respectability to holocaust denial has been joined
by the novel thesis of Guyora Binder that deconstruction is itself a form
of "Holocaust Judaism," nihilistic by existing only in opposition to
something else, and destructive because it lacks affirmative content.
We examined two formative influences studied by Binder, Levi-Straus-
sian structuralism and Sartrian existentialism, concluding that Levi-
Strauss' approach sought objective truths and Sartre's offered hope for
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historical progress through the ethical action of responsible individu-
als. Deconstruction reflects the search for understanding the complex
nature of observable phenomena, which characterizes structural an-
thropology, and the belief in individual responsibility which permeates
Sartre's philosophy. We also argued that, while signalling the end of
the Enlightenment view of humanity, deconstruction and holocaust
studies are both affirmative in nature, premised on a Sartrian belief
that history can be changed by individual acts.
Deconstruction cannot provide foundational values. It should not
be condemned or dismissed for its failure to do so, for its goals lie in
elucidating meaning through previously unperceived connections and
probing surface representations for underlying signification. Decon-
struction is neither a panacea for the despair with which some respond
to the modern predicament or to the human condition, nor a cause
of or for despair. For those who espouse the scientific tradition of
welcoming truth, deconstruction is a helpful tool for the enrichment
of our understanding.
The particular light which deconstruction sheds on internal para-
dox and inherent contradiction offers a framework for tolerance to-
wards those whose conclusions differ from our own, not so that we
become paralyzed into inaction or relinquish our stands, but so that
our controversies are fought with a maximum of respect for the legiti-
macy of our opponents' perspectives. Our opponents' perspectives will
not necessarily be legitimate nor does tolerance imply sanctioning
illegitimate positions. Deconstruction's relation to tolerance is in elu-
cidating connections of similarity in difference and vice versa, in ques-
tioning established categories and suggesting novel ones so that our
perception can expand. Deconstruction's selective application to tex-
tual phenomena which generate interpretive complexity safeguards
against a relativism which would condone all interpretations.
The deconstructionist perspective no doubt will continue to evoke
in many the profoundly human discomfiture provoked by certain un-
certainty. Deconstructionists do not resolve this dilemma, but, as they
strive to comprehend life's perplexities and to meet the challenges of
action and reaction, they also follow the advice of the poet who be-
lieved in loving the questions." 9
199 See RAINER MARIA RILKE, LETTERS To A YOUNG POET 35 (1934).
